A REALIST INTERPRETATION OF THE *CATEGORIES* IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY: THE *LITTERALIS SENTENTIA SUPER PRAEDICAMENTA ARISTOTELIS* OF ROBERT ALYNGTON

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Introduction

In the *Categories* Aristotle draws the main features of his metaphysics and semantics, since he (1) sets out the basic items of the world (individual and universal substances, individual and universal accidents) in their mutual relationships, and (2) shows their links to language. So the categorial table is a division both of things and the signs signifying them. Unfortunately, Aristotle does not clarify whether such a division is first of all a partition of things made on the basis of ontological criteria and only secondarily a classification of (mental, written, and spoken) terms, or vice versa.[1] Consequently, from late antiquity onwards there were many disputes about whether the treatise was primarily concerned with existent things or with their signs. According to the answer, it is customary to classify medieval philosophers as being Realists (things) or Nominalists (signs) concerning categories. This categorization is questionable. On the one hand, some authors, following Boethius,[2] support a nominalist solution of the problem of the *intentio* of the book (which would deal with non-compounded utterances in their capacity for being significant—*voces res significantes in eo quod significantes sunt* according to Boethius's formula), while they (1) offer a realist reading

[1] See J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione*, translated with notes by J. L. Ackrill, Oxford 1963, pp. 80–81.

[2] Cf. Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, PL 64, 159C and 160A. On Boethius's interpretation of Aristotle's *Categories* see James Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle," *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies*, 4 (1958), 217–244; Henry Chadwick, *Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy* (Oxford, 1981); Sten Ebbesen, "Boethius as an Aristotelian Commentator," in *Aristoteles: Werk und Wirkung*, ed. Jürgen Wiesner, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1987), pp. 286–311; Alessandro D. Conti, "Boezio commentatore e interprete delle *Categorie* di Aristotele," in *Scritti in onore di Girolamo Arnaldi offerti dalla Scuola Nazionale di Studi Medievali*, eds. A. Degrandi et al. (Rome, 2001), pp. 77–102.

of all the crucial points of the treatise and (2) judge the division into ten categories of the fourth chapter to be a division of things, and only derivatively of their signs.[3] In fact, we have to wait for for Ockham, Buridan, et alia to get a consistently nominalist exposition of the *Categories*. In detaching himself from the real Aristotelian intention, the *Venerabilis Inceptor* was (1) to consider the categorial table to concern terms alone and not things, and (2) to translate Aristotle's statements on the ontological and physical status of substances, quantities and so on, into rules for the correct use of terms, so that the level of language in the *Categories* was raised a step—the necessary presupposition of any consistently nominalist interpretation of the tract. On the other hand, many realist thinkers, such as Henry of Ghent, Simon of Faversham, "the first" Burley (before 1324), and Franciscus de Prato, held a reductionist position about the question of the number of real categories, as they judged only the items falling into the three absolute categories (substance, quantity, and quality) to be things (*res*), and considered the remaining ones real aspects (*respectus reales*) proper to the former.[4] Few medieval authors developed a fully consistent realist interpretation of the *Categories*, by defending the thesis of the real distinction of all the ten categories, which would be real things irreducible one to another.[5]

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[3] Cf. e.g., Robert Kilwardby, *Notulae super librum Praedicamentorum*, *prooem*., and lectio 5, Cambridge, Peterhouse, ms. 206, fols. 41ra, and 44vb–45ra; Thomas Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, *prooem*., and cap. d*e numero praedicamentorum*, Oxford, Merton College, ms. 289, fols. 3rb–va and 7ra (transcription in Alessandro D. Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the *Categories* according to the Ms Oxford, Merton College 289," in *The Rise of British Logic*, ed. P. O. Lewry (Toronto, 1985), pp. 173–213, pp. 189–191 and 196).

[4] Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa quaestionum ordinariarum*, a. 32, q. 5, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 27, pp. 79–80; *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, ed. (Parisiis, 1518), 2 vols., vol. 1, fols. 238r–240v; Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 12, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 1, ed. Pasquale Mazzarella (Padua, 1957), pp. 82–85; Walter Burley, *Tractatus super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum* (Cambridge, Peterhouse), ms. 184, fol. 175rb–176rb; Franciscus de Prato, *Logica*, pars I, tr. 5, a. 1, in Fabrizio Amerini, *La logica di Francesco da Prato. Con l'edizione critica della* Loyca *e del* Tractatus de voce univoca (Florence, 2005), p. 381.

[5] Cf. e.g., John Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 1, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 1, pp. 249–256, especially pp. 250–251; Walter Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, ed. (Venetiis, 1509), fol. 21ra–b; Jacobus de Placentia, *Scriptum super librum Praedicamentorum* (Venice), Biblioteca Marciana, ms. lat. VI.97 (2594), fol. 30rb–va. On Duns Scotus's conception of the categories see Peter King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," *in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 28–38; Giorgio Pini, "Scotus's Realist Conception of the Categories: His Legacy to Late Medieval Debates," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 63–100. On Burley's categorial doctrine

Among them, Robert Alyngton[6] († 1398), one of the most important authors of the generation after Wyclif, must be mentioned: his commentary on the *Categories*, which relies on Burley's last commentary on the *Categories* (A.D. 1337) and Wyclif's *De ente praedicamentali* (A.D. 1369),[7] is the most mature output of this "stronger" interpretative tradition. Alyngton was able to work out (1) a coherently realist ontology of the categories, (2) a new semantic theory of second intentions,[8] and (3) the general strategy adopted by the Oxford Realists after Wyclif,[9] as

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see Alessandro D. Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary on the *Ars Vetus*," *Franciscan Studies* 50 (1990), 121–176, pp. 145–174; and Marta Vittorini, *Predicabili e categorie nell'ultimo commento di Walter Burley all'*Isagoge *di Porfirio*, Ph.D. diss., University of Salerno, academic year 2004–05, pp. 335–397. On Jacobus de Placentia's commentary on the *Categories* see Alessandro D. Conti, "Il commento di Giacomo da Piacenza all'*Isagoge* e alle *Categorie*," in *L' insegnamento della logica a Bologna nel XIV secolo*, eds. Dino Buzzetti – Maurizio Ferriani – Andrea Tabarroni (Bologna, 1992), pp. 441–460.

[6] Not a great deal is known of Robert Alyngton's life. Most of the information about him comes from A. B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1957–59), vol. 1, pp. 30–31. From 1379 until 1386, he was fellow of Queens College (the same Oxford college where Wyclif started his theological studies in 1363 and Johannes Sharpe taught in the 1390s); he became *Magister Artium* and, by 1393, doctor of theology. He was chancellor of the University in 1393 and 1395. In 1382 he preached Wyclif's religious and political ideas in Hampshire (A. K. McHardy, "The Dissemination of Wyclif's Ideas," in *From Ockham to Wyclif*, eds. Anne Hudson – Michael J. Wilks (Oxford, 1987), 361–368, pp. 361–362). He was rector of Long Whatton, Leicestershire, where he died by September 1398. Alyngton was of considerable repute as a logician (see E. Jennifer Ashworth – Paul V. Spade, "Logic in Late Medieval Oxford," in *The History of the University of Oxford*, eds. Jeremy I. Catto – Ralph Evans (Oxford, 1992), vol. 2, pp. 50–62, *passim*). Among his extant works: the *Litteralis sententia super Praedicamenta Aristotelis* (henceforward *In Cat.*), partially edited in Alessandro D. Conti, "Linguaggio e realtà nel commento alle *Categorie* di Robert Alyngton," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 4 (1993), 179–306, pp. 242–306 (all references are to the pages of this edition or, for the unedited portions, to the ms. London, Lambeth Palace 393); a treatise on the supposition of terms (*Tractatus de suppositionibus terminorum*); a commentary on the *Liber sex principiorum*; a treatise on the genera of being (*Tractatus generum*).

[7] On Wyclif's categorial doctrine see Alessandro D. Conti, "Logica intensionale e metafisica dell' essenza in John Wyclif," *Bollettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio muratoriano* 99.1 (1993), 159–219, pp. 197–209; Alessandro D. Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," in *A Companion to John Wyclif*, ed. Ian C. Levy (Leiden, 2006), 67–125, pp. 103–113.

[8] See Alessandro D. Conti, "Second Intentions in the Late Middle Ages," in *Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition*, eds. Sten Ebbesen – Russell L. Friedman (Copenhagen, 1999), pp. 453–470.

[9] For an analysis of Oxford Realists's main doctrines and information on their lives and works see Alessandro D. Conti, "Studio storico-critico," in Johannes Sharpe, *Quaestio super universalia*, ed. Alessandro D. Conti (Florence, 1990), pp. 211–238, and 295–336; Alain de Libera, *La querelle des universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1996), pp. 403–428; and Alessandro D. Conti, "Categories and Universals in the Later Middle Ages," in this volume.

he methodically substituted reference to external objective realities for reference to linguistic and/or mental activities.

In what follows I shall offer a short analysis of Alyngton's doctrine of categories. This will enable us to appreciate the novelty of his thought and to gauge his importance within late medieval realism. He was one of the first authors whose commentary on the *Categories* shows that partial "dissolution" of the traditional doctrine which is the distinctive feature of the theories evolved during the very last period of the Middle Ages. In the first section, I shall sketch Alyngton's position on being and categories as well as his theory of analogy. The second section will deal with Alyngton's conception of universals and predication, the most innovative section of his philosophical system. In the third one, I shall discuss his ideas about substance. The fourth section will expound his central theses on the nature, reality, and mutual distinctions of the three main kinds of accidents: quantity, quality, and relation. In a final section, I shall draw some conclusions about the general significance of Alyngton's commentary on the *Categories* trying to place it within the historical and doctrinal context of the late medieval commentaries on that text.

Being and Categories

The point of departure of every realist interpretation of the *Categories* is the notion of being (*ens*) in its relationship to the ten categories, as Realists considered the categorial table to be a division of beings. Thus, it is not surprising that, like Burley, Alyngton affirms that (1) the division into ten categories is first of all a division of things existing outside the mind, and only secondarily of the mental concepts and spoken or written terms which signify them, and (2) things belonging to one categorial field are really distinct from those belonging to another—for instance, substances are really distinct from quantities, qualities, and relations; quantities are really distinct from substances, qualities, and relations, and so on.[10] Unfortunately Alyngton does not define being; yet, what he says about (1) the subject of the book (the real categorial

[10] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 251, 252–253, 255, and especially p. 258.

being which can be signified by atomic expressions—*ens in praedicamento reali significabile per signum incomplexum*),[11] and (2) analogy[12] seems to entail that, like Wyclif,[13] he also thinks of being (*ens*) as a sort of an extramental reality proper to everything (God and creatures; substances and accidents; universal and individual items; things, collections of things, and states of affairs) according to different modes and degrees.[14]

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, all the realist authors, with the only remarkable exception of Duns Scotus, (1) regarded categorial items as composed of two main aspects: the inner nature or essence, and their peculiar mode of being or of being predicated (*modi essendi vel praedicandi*); and (2) maintained that the categorial table divides those categorial items according to their modes of being (or of being predicated) and not according to their inner natures (or essences). In more detail, Thomas Aquinas[15] and Thomas Sutton[16] (1) based their method of finding the ten Aristotelian categories on the differences of modes of being predicated, and (2) recognized three fundamental modes of being predicated: (i) essentially, proper to substances, when the predication indicates what a given *res* is; (ii) accidentally, proper to quantities, qualities, and *ad aliquid*, when the predication indicates that something inheres in a subject; and (iii) externally, proper to the remaining six categories, when the predication indicates that something which does not inhere in the subject nevertheless affects it. On the contrary,

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[11] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 252.

[12] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de aequivocis*, fol. 70r–v—see note 31, below.

[13] Cf. Wyclif, *De ente in communi*, cap. 3, in *Summa de ente libri primi tractatus primus et secundus*, ed. Samuel H. Thomson, Oxford 1930, p. 36; *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 1, ed. Rudolf Beer (London, 1891), pp. 2 and 5.

[14] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de complexo et incomplexo*, p. 249; cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 255.

[15] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia super Metaphysicam*, liber V, lectio 9, eds. M.R. Cathala – R. M. Spiazzi (Turin, 1950), nn. 889–891. On Aquinas's derivation of the Categories, see John F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories (Predicaments)," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25 (1987), 13–34.

[16] Cf. Sutton, *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum*, cap. d*e numero praedicamentorum*, fol. 7ra–b (partial transcription in Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the *Categories*" cit., p. 196).

Albert the Great[17] and Simon of Faversham[18] (1) based their method of finding the categories on the differences of modes of being, and (2) admitted two fundamental modes of being: (i) being by itself, proper to substance; and (ii) being in something else, proper to the nine genera of accidents—(2.1) the latter subdivided into (i) being in something else absolutely, proper to quantities and qualities, and (ii) being in something else in virtue of a relation to a third *res* (*esse ad aliud*), proper to the remaining seven categories. In his last commentary on the *Categories*, Walter Burley[19] recalled two other ways of deducing the ten Aristotelian categories (*aliqui acceperunt sufficientiam praedicamentorum sic . . . aliter accipiunt alii sic*), both based on the various levels of similarity among their own modes of being. In turn, Alyngton follows very closely Burley's first way of deriving the ten categories. In his opinion, there are two fundamental modes of being proper to things: being by itself, which characterizes substances, and being in something else (*alteri inheaerens*), which characterizes accidents. The latter is subdivided into three less general modes: being in something else in virtue of its matter; being in something else in virtue of its form; and being in something else in virtue of the whole composite. Something can be in something else in virtue of its matter, form, and composite according to three different ways: from inside (*ab intrinseco*), from outside (*ab extrinseco*), and partially from inside and partially from outside (*partim ab intrinseco et partim ab extrinseco*). If something is in something else in virtue of its matter and from inside, then it is a quantity; if from outside, it is a where (*ubi*); if partially from inside and partially from outside, it is an affection (*passio*). If something is in something else in virtue of its form and

[17] Cf. Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 1, cap. 7, in *Opera omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris, 1890), vol. 1, pp. 164–165. Today's scholars unanimously attribute to Albert the idea that *Categories* are divided according to their modes of being predicated, since he himself affirms that his own method of deducing the ten Aristotelian *Categories* is based on their modes of being predicated (*nos, quantum possumus, studebimus ex propriis horum generum modis praedicandi ostendere hujus numeri rationem*); but, in point of fact, he does not utilize modes of being predicated in drawing the ten categories from being. On the contrary, he constantly employs modes of being, as he speaks of *ens per se, ens in alio, ad aliud se habere, absolute inesse secundum materiam* and *secundum potentiam formae* and so on.

[18] Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 12, p. 84.

[19] Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, fol. 21rb–va. On Burley's solution of the problem of the *sufficientia praedicamentorum* see Mischa von Perger, "Understanding the Categories by Division: Walter Burley vs. William of Ockham," in *La tradition médiévale des Catégories (XII^e–XV^e siècles)*, eds. Joel Biard – Irène Rosier-Catach (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003), pp. 37–52.

from inside, then it is a quality; if from outside, it is when (*quando vel quandalitas*); if partially from inside and partially from outside, it is an action (*actio*). If something is in something else in virtue of the whole composite and from inside, then it is a relation; if from outside, it is a possession (*habitus*); if partially from inside and partially from outside, it is a position (*positio*).[20]

Alyngton's choice implies an anti-reductionist approach to the matter, which is confirmed by the solution of the problem of what properly falls into the categorial fields. Unlike most medieval authors, Alyngton was aware of the importance of the question, which he discussed at length. According to the standard realist conception, not only the accidental forms, such as whiteness, but also the compounds they cause when inhering in substances, such as a white-thing (*album*), fall into the categories. Burley thought that whilst the accidental forms properly fall into the categories, the aggregates (*aggregata*) made up from a substance and an accidental form do not, since they are beings (*entia*) *per accidens*, wanting in real unity. In his opinion, such an aggregate may be said to fall into a certain category, the category into which its accidental form falls, only by reduction, in virtue of the accidental form itself.[21] On the contrary, Wyclif maintained that the aggregates built up by a substance and an accidental form fall *per accidens* into both (1) the category of substance and (2) the category which the accidental form at issue belongs to.[22] Alyngton combines in an original way the two slightly different opinions of Burley and Wyclif. He affirms that a thing (*res*) can be said to belong to a category in a threefold way (*tripliciter*): by itself (*per se*), by accident (*per accidens*), and by reduction (*per reductionem*). (1) Something is in a category by itself if and only if the *supremum genus* of

[20] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 252–253.

[21] Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de relatione*, fol. 34rb: "Illud quod est aggregatum ex rebus diversorum generum non est per se in aliquo genere uno.… Et ideo illud quod significatur per huiusmodi nomina 'pater' et 'filius' non est per se in genere, quia quod est per se in genere debet esse per se ens et per se unum, sed aggregatum ex rebus diversorum generum non est per se ens nec per se unum;" and cap. *de qualitate*, fol. 41rb: "Dico quod quamvis album vel nigrum non sit per se in genere, tamen est in genere qualitatis per reductionem."

[22] Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 1, pp. 3–4.

that category is predicated[23] *per se in recto* of it,[24] that is, if and only if the highest genus of that category is one of the constitutive elements of the essence of the thing at issue. Accidental forms belong *per se* to the nine categories of accidents.[25] (2) Something is in a category by accident if and only if it is an aggregate from a substance and an accidental form. Such aggregates belong *per accidens* both to the category of substance and to the category in which its accidental form is by itself.[26] (3) Something can be in a category by reduction in two different ways: in a broad sense (*large*) and in a strict sense (*stricte*). (3.1) Something is in a category *per reductionem* large if and only if (i) it is an aggregate, and (ii) the highest genus of a certain category is predicated only *in obliquo* of it, that is, only indirectly. (3.2) Something is in a category *per reductionem stricte* if and only if (i) it is not an aggregate, and, (ii.a) like differences, it is a component of the reality of a thing which is in a category by itself, but the highest genus of that category is not predicated of it; or (ii.b) it is the privation correlated to a certain property which, in turn, is in a category by itself; or (ii.c), like extra-categorial principle such as God, the unity, and the point, it somehow instantiates the mode of being proper to a certain categorial field, but the highest genus of that category is not one of the constitutive elements of the essence of that thing.[27]

Fundamental to Alyngton's deduction of the categories and solution of the problem of what falls into the categorial fields (and how) is a close isomorphism between language (mental, written, and spoken) and the world. Like Burley and Wyclif, he was firmly convinced that our thought is modelled on reality itself, so that it reproduces reality in all its elements, levels, and inner relations. Therefore, one of the best ways of understanding the world lay for him in an accurate investigation of our notions and conceptual schemes, as they show the structure of the world. A logical consequence of this conviction was his strong propensity towards reification: he hypostatises the notion of being

[23] According to Alyngton, predication is a real relation between things. Such a real predication (*praedicatio realis*) is matched by a corresponding predicative relation between the signs (mental, written, and spoken) which signify those things—cf. *In Cat.*, cap. *de regulis praedicationis*, p. 247; cap. *de substantia*, pp. 273 and 287.

[24] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 259.

[25] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 300.

[26] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, p. 259; and cap. *de relativis*, p. 300.

[27] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 259–260.

and considers equivocity, analogy, and univocity not only as semantic relations between terms and things, but also as real relations between extra-mental items.[28]

According to the standard interpretation of the opening passages of the *Categories* (1, 1a 1–12) equivocal terms are correlated with more than one concept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing different natures, whereas univocal terms are correlated with only one concept and refer to a multiplicity of things sharing one and the same nature. In his last commentary on the *Physics* (after 1324), Burley had maintained that the term 'being' is at the same time univocal and equivocal with respect to the categories, as (1) a single concept corresponds to it (broadly speaking univocity), but (2) the categorial items share it in different ways, according to a hierarchy of value (broadly speaking equivocity).[29] In turn, Wyclif had admitted three main types of equivocity: by chance (*a casu*), analogical, and generic, the second of which applies to the relationship between being and categories.[30] Alyngton recognises four main kinds of equivocity: by chance, deliberate (*a consilio*), analogical, and generic. (1) Equivocals by chance are those things to which it just happens that they have the same name, but with different meanings and/or reasons for imposing the name. (2) Those things are deliberate equivocals which have distinct natures but the same name, and are subordinated to different but correlated concepts. (3) Those things are analogical which share the nature signified by their common name in various degrees and/or ways. (4) Generic equivocals are those things which share the same generic nature in the same way, but have distinct specific natures of different absolute value.[31] So, within Alyngton's

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[28] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de aequivocis*, fols. 69v–70v; cap. *de univocis*, fols. 71v–72r; and cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 255–256.

[29] Cf. Burley, *Expositio in libros octo Physicorum*, lib. I, tr. 2, cap. 1, ed. (Venetiis, 1501), fols. 12vb–13ra.

[30] Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 2, pp. 16–17, 18–19, and 21. On Wyclif's theory of analogy see Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 103–107.

[31] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de aequivocis*, fol. 70r–v: "Ubi primo notandum, secundum sententiam aliquorum, quod quadruplex est aequivocum. Est enim aequivocum a casu, aequivocum a consilio, aequivocum analogum et aequivocum generale. Est autem a casu quod imponitur casualiter ad significandum diversa secundum rationes dispares quarum nulla habet habitudinem ad aliam. Et illud est pure aequivocum. Ut iste terminus 'Robertus' a casu imponitur ad significandum hominem Romae et ad significandum hominem Oxoniae.… Sed aliud est aequivocum a consilio, quod est signum ex impositione significans aliqua primarie sub diversis actibus secundum rationes dispares quarum una tamen est analoga vel proportionalis ad aliam, sed non correspondet illi signo adaequate aliqua una intentio vel conceptus ad omnem rem

system, what differentiates analogy from univocity is the way in which a certain nature (or property) is shared by a set of things: analogous things share it according to different degrees (*secundum magis et minus*, or *secundum prius et posterius*), univocal things share it all in the same manner and to the same degree.[32] Alyngton argues that being (*ens*) is not a sort of genus in relation to the ten categories, since it does not manifest their essence, nor is it predicated univocally of them; being is analogous in relation to the ten categories. It is a sort of basic stuff of the metaphysical structure of each reality, which possesses it in accordance with its own nature and level in the hierarchy of essences.[33]

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sic significatam. Et isto modo iste terminus 'canis' significat caeleste sydus, marinam beluam et animal latrabile, et forte propter proportionales proprietates repertas in omnibus istis rebus, puta acute mordendi vel aliud huiusmodi.… Et isto modo dicitur 'sanum' aequivoce de dieta, urina, medico, subiecto sano. Et ita de aliis.… Sed tertio modo dicitur signum aequivocum analogum cuius primarium significatum est analogum. Et hoc contingit quando illud significatum participatur a pluribus secundum prius et posterius quo ad ordinem intelligendi, vel secundum maius et minus; modo quo ens participatur a substantia et accidente. Non enim contingit intelligere accidens, cum sit modus substantiae, nisi praeintelligendo substantiam; immo omnis substantia est magis ens quam accidens. Vel dicitur, secundum aliquos, ens a parte rei analogum eo quod est participatum a generibus diversis, quorum unum genus causat omne quod est per se in alio genere et secundum quidlibet sui causat aliquid alterius generis; sicut ens communicatur substantiae et accidenti. Nam omnis substantia causat aliquod accidens et omne accidens causatur ab aliqua substantia—sed de isto posterius.… Sed quarto modo dicitur signum aequivocum generale si significet res diversarum perfectionum essentialium. Et sic omne genus est aequivocum; propter quod dicit Aristoteles in VII *Physicorum* quod in generibus multae latent aequivocationes."

[32] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de univocis*, fol. 71v: " Notandum quod tripliciter est aliquod signum aut eius primarium significatum univocum. Primo modo dicitur omne signum univocum quod sub uno conceptu plura adaequate significat, sive praedicetur de illis aequaliter, sive secundum maius et minus, sive secundum prius et posterius. Et isto modo transcendentia sunt univoca. Sed secundo <modo> magis proprie dicitur signum univocum si plura sub uno conceptu adaequate significet quibus competit aliqua differentialis proprietas aeque primo. Sic omne genus praedicabile est univocum. Et voco 'differentialem proprietatem' proprietatem essentialem non participatam secundum maius et minus, per quam distinguitur ens unius praedicamenti vel generis a re alterius praedicamenti vel generis. Et dico 'aeque primo' propter analoga, quae secundum maius et minus sive secundum prius et posterius competunt suis contentis, ut substantia est tam maius ens quam prius ens quam accidens. Sed tertio modo strictissime dicitur signum univocum quod solum res eiusdem perfectionis essentialis sub eadem definitione significat. Sic species specialissima solum est univoca."

[33] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de numero et sufficientia praedicamentorum*, pp. 255–256.

Universals and Predication

Among the many kinds of *entia* that Alyngton admits, the most important set is that consisting of universal items. Universals are among the most disputed topics in Medieval philosophical literature.[34] Like Wyclif and the other Oxford Realists, Alyngton claims that universals fully exist outside the minds and are really identical-to and formally distinct-from the individuals which instantiate them.

Alyngton speaks of universals, individuals, and predication mainly in the chapter on substance, but interesting remarks can be found also in the chapter on subject and predicate (*de subiecto* and *praedicato*). Like Albert the Great,[35] whom he quotes by name, Alyngton recognizes three main kinds of universals: (1) *ante rem*, or ideal universals—that is, the ideas in God, the archetypes of all that is; (2) *in re*, or formal universals—that is, the common natures present in the individual items as constitutive parts of their whole reality; and (3) *post rem*, or intentional universals—that is, the mental signs which signify formal universals. The ideas in God are the causes of formal universals, and formal universals are the causes of intentional universals.[36] Furthermore, like Burley and Wyclif, Alyngton holds that formal universals actually exist (*in actu*) outside our minds, and not potentially only (*in potentia*), as moderate realists thought—even if, unlike Burley, he maintains they are really identical with their individuals, for otherwise it would be impossible to explain, against the Nominalists, why and how individual substances show different and more or less close kinds of similarity among themselves.[37]

Like Wyclif, Alyngton supports the thesis that formal universals are common natures in virtue of which the individuals that share them are exactly what they are, just as humanity is the form by which every man formally is a man. As natures, they are prior and indifferent to any division into universals and individuals. Although universality is not a constitutive mark of the nature itself, it is its unique, inseparable property. As a consequence, formal universals can be conceived of in

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[34] For a brief account of the problem of universals (and predication) in the (Later) Middle Ages see Conti, "Categories and Universals" in this volume.

[35] Cf. Albert the Great, *De quinque universalibus*, tr. *de universalibus in communi*, capp. 3 and 5, ed. Col., vol. 1.1A, pp. 24–25 and 31–32.

[36] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 276–279.

[37] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 267–268. See also p. 290.

two different ways: by themselves, as first intentions, or in union with and from the point of view of their inseparable property, that is, the *universalitas*, and therefore as second intentions. In the first case, they are natures of a certain kind and are really identical with their own individuals. For example, man is the same thing as Socrates. In the second case, they are properly universals (that is, something that can be present in many things at once *qua* constitutive element of their essence), and distinct from their own individuals, considered *qua* individuals, because of the opposite constitutive principles: *universalitas* and *particularitas*.[38] Hence, universals are really (*realiter*) identical to, but formally (*formaliter*) distinct from, their individuals. In fact, universals are like formal causes in relation to their own individuals, while individuals are like material causes in relation to their universals.[39] Thus three different kinds of items can be qualified as formal universals: (1) the common natures (or essences) instantiated by individuals—common natures which are things of first intention; (2) the form itself of universality that belongs to a certain common nature when seen in its relation to the individuals—form of universality which is a thing of second intention; (3) the intelligibility proper to the common nature, by which it is a possible object of our mind—in other words, the real principle which connects formal universals with mental universals.[40]

Since Alyngton accepted the core of the traditional, realist account of the relationship between formal universals and individuals, he, like Wyclif, had to define its logical structure more accurately, in order to avoid the inconsistencies stressed by Ockham[41] and his followers. Thus he restates that (1) a universal in the category of substance can directly receive only the predications of substantial forms more common than it; and (2) the accidental forms inhering in individual substances can be predicated of the universal substantial form that those individuals instantiate only indirectly (*essentialiter*) in virtue of the individuals themselves having that substantial form.[42] For this reason, Alyngton's

[38] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 268.
[39] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 275–276.
[40] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 277. This partition of the formal universal is very similar to that propounded by Wyclif in his *Tractatus de universalibus*, cap. 2, p. 64.
[41] See Conti's article, "Categories and Universals."
[42] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de regulis praedicationis*, pp. 246–248; cap. *de substantia*, pp. 288–289.

description of the logical structure of the relationship between universals and individuals demanded a redefinition of predication.

Alyngton presents his own theory of predication when commenting on *Categories* 5, 3a4–5, where Aristotle seems to admit the possibility that an accidental form can inhere in a universal substance, as he affirms that the fact that an individual man is a grammarian implies the fact that also the man and the animal are such.[43] In order to explain and justify this affirmation, Alyngton introduces a new interpretation and partition of the predication, different from both the standard one and Wyclif's. Indeed, he was the first one to ameliorate Wyclif's theory (1) by cutting off Wyclif's habitudinal predication, and (2) by dividing predication into formal predication (*praedicatio formalis*) and remote inherence (*inhaerentia remota*), or predication by essence (*praedicatio secundum essentiam*). Remote inherence is grounded on a partial identity between subject and predicate, which share some, but not all, metaphysical constituents, and does not demand that the form signified by the predicate-term be directly present in the entity signified by the subject-term. On the contrary, such a direct presence is required by formal predication. 'Man is an animal' and 'Socrates is white' are instances of formal predication; '(What is) singular is (what is) common' ('*singulare est commune*') and 'Humanity is (something) running' ('*humanitas est currens*') are instances of remote inherence, since, according to Alyngton, the property of running is imputable to the form of humanity, if at least one man is running. He is careful, however, to use a substantival adjective in its neuter form as a predicate-term, because only in this way can it appear that the form signified by the predicate-term is not directly present in the subject, but is indirectly attributed to it through its individuals.[44] Formal predication itself is in turn divided into formal substantial and formal accidental predication, since formal predication necessarily demands the direct presence of a form in a substrate, and, according to Alyngton, this can occur in two different ways: either as one of the inner constitutive element of the substrate (substantially), or as one of its subsidiary properties (accidentally). Formal accidental predication is then further divided into *secundum motum* and *secundum habitudinem*.[45]

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[43] On this passage from Aristotle's *Categories* and its significance to the Aristotelian theory of predication see James Duerlinger, "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's *Categories*," *Phronesis* 15 (1970), 179–203.

[44] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 289.

[45] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 289.

The basic idea of this last division seems to be that modes of being and natures of the accidental forms determine the set of substances which can play the role of their substrate. Alyngton distinguishes between those accidental forms that require a substance capable of undergoing change (*per se mobile*) as their own direct substrate of inherence, and those ones which do not need a substrate with such a characteristic. Forms like quantity, whiteness, *risibilitas*, alteration, diminution and so on belong to the first group, while relations of reason and *respectus*, like causation, difference, *dilectio* and so on, fall under the second one. The forms of the first group bring about formal accidental predication *secundum motum*, while the forms of the second group bring about formal accidental predication *secundum habitudinem*. The former necessarily entail singular substances as their substrates, since singulars alone can undergo change, while only the latter can directly inhere in universal natures (*possunt inesse denominative universalibus*).[46]

Substance

These remarks on the relations between the accidental forms and substances bring us to the core of Alyngton's ontology: the doctrine of substance, developed in the fifth chapter of his commentary on the *Categories*. Alyngton's discussion can be divided into two main parts. (1) The first attempts to clarify what characterizes substance, and therefore (1.1) what falls by itself into this category; (2) the second is concerned with the distinction between primary and secondary substances.

Alyngton lists seven opinions about the nature and mode of being of substance, the last of which he supports. (1) According to the first one, proper to grammarians, substance is what the term 'substance' refers to when utilized in a broad sense, that is, the quiddity (*quidditas*) or essence (*essentia*) of anything. In this case, substance is not a category, since the items which fulfill this description do not share any common nature.[47] (2) The second opinion is that of Avicenna, who affirms that any entity which does not inhere in something else is a substance.[48] According to

[46] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de subiecto et praedicato*, p. 245. See also cap. *de substantia*, p. 274.
[47] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 263.
[48] Cf. Avicenna, *Liber de philosophia prima*, tr. 8, cap. 4, ed. Simone Van Riet, 2 vols. (Louvain, 1977–80), vol. 2, pp. 403–404.

this view, God, substantial differences, and negative truths can be said to be substances, even though only in an analogical way.[49] (3) A third meaning of the term 'substance' can be drawn from the use (of that term) proper to common people and theologians: everything which plays the role of foundation (*fundamentum*) in relation to something else is a substance. In this sense, the surface is the foundation (and therefore the substance) of the whiteness.[50] (4) The fourth opinion seems to be the same as the anonymous one discussed and partially criticized by Burley in his last commentary on the *Categories*.[51] Substance would be (i) a positive being, which (ii) does not inhere in something else, and (iii) is naturally apt to play the role of subject (*subiectum*) in relation to absolute accidents (that is, quantities and qualities). According to this view, matter, form, the composite made up of matter and form, and the angelic intelligences are substances, whereas substantial differences and negative truths are not, since the former do not satisfy the third requisite, neither the latter the first one.[52] (5) The fifth opinion is that of Boethius,[53] according to whom substance is (i) a positive being, which (ii) does not inhere in something else, and (iii) is a compound of matter and form.[54] (6) The sixth opinion is that of Burley,[55] to whom Alyngton refers by the expression 'moderni logici'. According to Burley, (i) not being in a subject, (ii) having an essence, (iii) autonomy and independent existence, and (iv) the capacity of underlying accidental forms are the main aspect of substances. This means that primary substances alone are substances properly speaking, while matter and form, and substantial differences are not.[56] (7) The last opinion is that of Wyclif,[57] quoted extensively and almost verbatim. Alyngton claims that it is superior to the preceding ones (*septima est expositio metaphysica et altior ad intelligendum quam praenominatae*). According to this view, the constitutive principle of the substance is not the capacity of underlying absolute accidents, but it is the capacity of underlying potency and act, which are its inner foundations—the capacity of underlying

[49] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 263–264.
[50] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 264.
[51] Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 22rb–va.
[52] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 264.
[53] Cf. Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, 184A–b.
[54] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 264.
[55] Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 24ra.
[56] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 265.
[57] Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 5, pp. 36–39.

accidents being only a derivative property.[58] Wyclif's position about the nature of substance implies that the distinction between potency and act is, from the point of view of metaphysics, the most fundamental distinction, of which that between form and matter is but one example. As (1) prime matter is pure potentiality, while form is act, and (2) the distinction between potency and act is wider than that between matter and form, the latter is a particular case of the former. In fact, according to Wyclif, the distinction between potency and act runs though the whole of creation, since it applies also to any kinds of spiritual creatures, whereas the distinction between matter and form is found only in the corporeal creatures. On the contrary, Alyngton seems to interpret the distinction between potency and act as a particular case of the distinction between matter and form, since he constantly explains the meaning of the opposition potency-act in terms of the opposition between matter and form in a crucial passage that he quotes from Wyclif's *De ente praedicamentali*:[59]

> According to this view, Aristotle says that primary substance exists in a proper way, because it is an absolute thing which does not inhere in something else, as accidents do (since their own being consists in inhering). And primary substance is said to exist in an eminent way in relation to potency and act (i.e., matter and form), which <i> are not complete beings, nor <ii> exist in an eminent way, as they exist in virtue of the composite. And primary substance is said to exist at the highest level in relation to those three, <that is: accidents, potency, and act>. Hence, primary substance is said to be at the highest level also in the chain of our knowledge, since nobody can understand accidents if he has not understood substance. Nor can anyone understand potency and act (i.e.,

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[58] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, p. 267: "Prima ratio substantiae est substare potentiae et actui sicut suis intrinsecis fundamentis, et non substare accidenti absoluto, cum hoc sit passio posterior substantiae."

[59] Alyngton, *In Cat*., cap. *de substantia*, p. 267 (= Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 5, pp. 38–39): "Et secundum istam sententiam dicit Aristoteles quod substantia prima proprie est, cum sit res absoluta non inhaerens sicut accidentia, quorum esse est inhaerere. Et principaliter dicitur in comparatione ad actum et potentiam (*id est: ad materiam et formam*), quae non sunt completa entia nec principaliter, cum sint propter compositum. Et maxime dicitur in comparatione ad haec tria. Unde et maxime dicitur esse in notitia hominum, cum nemo cognoscit accidens nisi praecognoscendo substantiam; nec aliquis cognoscit potentiam vel actum (*id est: materiam vel formam*) nisi praecognoscendo per se existens et transmutationem de uno esse ad aliud." Alyngton's additions are in italics. Wyclif and Alyngton misunderstand the meaning of Aristotle's statement about primary substance (*Categories* 5, 2a11–13), since the Stagirite is affirming that substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is what is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject.

> matter and form) if he has not understood <i> what exists by itself, and <ii> the change from one being to another.

The result is a sort of universal hylomorphism, since in this way matter and form serve as principles in the order of being as well as in the order of becoming. All the more so because Alyngton seems to accept the thesis that (angelic) intelligences are not pure forms existing by themselves, but formal principles necessarily joined to the matter of heaven in such a way as to make up living beings.[60]

A second consequence of this approach to the problem of the nature of substance is that, within his system, primary substances alone are substances properly speaking. This conclusion is confirmed by his analysis of the distinctive mark (*proprium*) of substance: while remaining numerically one and the same, being capable of admitting contrary properties, the modification taking place through a change in the subject itself of the motion at issue. Alyngton appears to think that this description is satisfied only by primary (that is, individual) substances.[61] Secondary substances therefore are *per se* in the category of substance only insofar as they are constitutive parts of primary substances. Thus, secondary substances belong to the category of substance by virtue of the individual substances that instantiate them, since they are not formally substances. In fact, unlike primary substances, secondary substances are forms, and consequently incomplete entities with an imperfect and dependent mode of existence. They require composite substances in order to exist properly. No form as such, not even the substantial

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[60] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 264.

[61] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 104v: "Maxime autem substantiae videtur esse proprium quod cum sit unum et idem numero, est susceptivum contrariorum. Haec est sexta proprietas. Pro qua notandum est quod duplex solet dici subiectum transmutationis, scilicet per se subiectum et per accidens subiectum. Voco 'per se subiectum transmutationis' substantiam compositam ex materia et forma, cui inest primo denominative transmutatio. Et dicitur per se subiectum transmutationis quia est subiectum non subiectatum ulterius, quia primo sibi inest transmutatio. Sed per accidens subiectum potest esse tripliciter. Aut quia non inest sibi transmutatio primo denominative, sed secundum quid vel secundum partem, ut si dicatur hominem transmutari quia pars eius transmutatur. Et tale potest esse per se subiectum transmutationis. Sed secundo per accidens dicitur esse subiectum transmutationis omne accidens quod potest recipere contrarias denominationes propter transmutationem subiecti per quod extenditur vel in quo subiectatur. Et tale numquam potest esse per se subiectum transmutationis, cum non potest non inhaerere. Et tertio omne contentum in alio, sive per modum formae actuantis sive per modum locati moti ad motum sui contentis, dicitur per accidens subiectum transmutationis; ut homo in navi, anima in corpore. Et talium aliqua possunt esse per se subiecta transmutationum et aliqua non."

ones, is formally a substance, since no form as such has the capacity of underlying potency and act. Secondary substances are related to primary (or individual) substances as formal principles of the latter. It is in this way that humanity and (say) Socrates are linked together. For this reason no secondary substances as such are totally identical with primary substances.[62] As a consequence, while 'man is animal' ('*homo est animal*') is a sentence to which a formal predication corresponds in the world, a predication by essence matches 'humanity is animality' ('*humanitas est animalitas*'). Any (individual) man is an animal because of the form of humanity present in him *qua* its essential constituent, albeit the form of humanity as such is not the principle of animality. Therefore, humanity is not formally animality nor rationality, even though it is animality plus rationality.[63]

Primary substances are the substrate of existence of any other kinds of categorial being, as nothing exists in addition to primary substances but secondary substances and accidents, which both are forms present in individual substances. Like Aristotle (*Categories* 5, 2b5–6), Alyngton can therefore affirm that primary substances are the necessary condition of existence for any other items of the world: nothing could exist, if primary substances stopped existing.[64] This does not mean, however, that it would be possible to find in the world a primary substance (1) that would not belong to a certain species, and (2) without any accident inhering in it. It means that, from the point of view of full existence, accidents and secondary substances always presuppose primary substances, as to be a primary substance is to be an autonomous singular existing item (*hoc aliquid*), whilst (1) to be a secondary substance is to be an inner and essential determination (or form) of a primary substance (*quale quid*), and (2) to be an accident is to be an outer determination or aspect of a primary substance.[65]

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[62] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 280. See also pp. 281 and 282–283.

[63] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, pp. 283–284. See also cap. *de quantitate*, fols. 106v–107r.

[64] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, p. 286.

[65] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de substantia*, fol. 101v: "Ubi notandum est quod hoc aliquid est individuum de cuius essentia non est, ut huiusmodi, cum alio componere qualitative aliquid. Et sic nec materia prima nec forma substantialis materialis est proprie hoc aliquid. Et solum tale dicitur proprie ponere in numerum quod (qui ms.) est quantitas discreta—ut patebit posterius. Ideo solum tale communiter vocatur unum numero. Et sic non est universale formaliter unum numero, quamvis large loquendo de uno numero, prout dicit ens quod cum alio constituit multitudinem, posset universale dici unum numero. Sic ergo patet quomodo substantia prima repraesentat hoc aliquid.

Accidents

As we have just seen, Alyngton thinks of primary substances as the ultimate substrates of existence in relation to anything else. As a consequence, for him, the only way (1) to safeguard the reality of accidents as well as their distinction from substance and from each other, while at the same time, (2) to affirm their dependence on substance in existence, was to conceive of them as forms of the substance itself, and therefore as something existentially incomplete. Accordingly, he insists that quantity, quality, and relations, considered as abstract accidents, are forms inherent in primary substances, whereas, if considered from the point of view of their actual existence as concrete items, they are not really distinct from the substance in which they are present, but only formally, as they are modes of substances. So, the chief features of Alyngton's treatment of accidents are (1) his twofold consideration of them as abstract forms and as concrete properties as well as (2) his commitment to their objective reality, since, in his opinion, they are mind-independent items of the world in both cases. Hence, the main goals of his reading of the chapters 6–8 of the Aristotelian treatise are (1) showing the ordered internal structure of the chief categories of accidents, and (2) reasserting their reality and real distinction from the category of substance, against those thinkers, like Ockham and his followers, who had attempted to reduce quantity and relations to mere aspects of material substances.

Secunda vero substantia videtur sub figura appellationis repraesentare principaliter hoc aliquid, ut cum hoc dixerit hominem vel animal. Sed non est verum. Sed magis significat quale quid, id est: substantialem qualitatem. Neque enim verum est quod subiectum est, neque substantia secunda est unum numero quod subicitur, modo quo primae substantiae subiciuntur; sed de pluribus dicitur secunda substantia, ut homo et animal. Et quia aliquis posset credere quod substantia secunda significat qualitatem, modo quo albedo aut aliud accidens significat qualitatem, removet hoc Aristoteles dicens quod secunda substantia non significat simpliciter quale, quemadmodum album et albedo, quia album (id est: albedo) nihil aliud significat a subiecto quam qualitatem accidentalem (id est: non significat aliquod quid vel aliquam partem quidditatis substantiae, sed solum qualitatem). Genera autem et species quae sunt secundae substantiae determinant quamdam qualitatem circa substantiam (id est: significant vel determinant qualitatem substantialem quae est pars quidditatis substantiae). Sic enim vocatur differentia substantialis 'qualitas substantialis', V *Metaphysicae*, commento 19°." See also fol. 102r–v.

1. According to the standard realist interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine of the categories, followed also by Alyngton,[66] among the nine genera of accidents, quantity is the most important one, as it is the basis of all further accidents, since quantity orders material substances for receiving quality and the other accidental forms. On the contrary, Ockham had claimed that it was superfluous to posit quantitative forms really distinct from substance and quality, since quantity presupposes what it is intended to explain, that is, the extension of material substances and their having parts outside parts. As an accident, quantity needs substance as its substrate of inherence.[67] Like Burley and Wyclif, Alyngton denies that material substance can be actually extended without the presence of the general form of quantity in it, thereby affirming its necessity. Hence, he tries to confute Ockham's argumentation. He thinks that the existence of quantity always implies that of substance, but he also believes that the actual existence of parts in a substance necessarily implies the presence of a general form of quantity in it, (1) really distinct from the substance (say Socrates) in which it inheres, and (2) formally distinct from the fact, grounded on the substance at issue, that this same substance is a quantified thing. For Alyngton, what characterizes quantity and differentiates it from the other accidental forms, and in particular from quality, are the following features: (1) being the appropriate measure of anything, and (2) being an absolute entity which makes it possible that material substances actually have parts outside parts.[68]

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[66] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat*., cap. *de quantitate*, fol. 106r: "*Quantitatis aliud continuum aliud discretum*. Hoc est secundum capitulum secundae partis huius libri, in quo tractatur de secundo praedicamento, quod est quantitas. Sicut enim materia prima est prima in via generationis substantiae materialis, ita quantitas, quae consequitur materiam seu substantiam materialem, videtur esse prior in ordine procedendi quam fuit alia accidentia consequentia substantiam materialem. Ideo ponitur a multis tamquam basis aliorum accidentium."

[67] Cf. Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 10.4, in *Opera philosophica*, vol. 2, pp. 205–224.

[68] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat*., cap. *de quantitate*, fols. 106v: "Patet ergo quod quantitas eo quod absolutum sufficienter distinguitur a generibus respectivis, et in hoc quod de se habet partes extra partes distinguitur a qualitate;" 107r: "Omnis autem quantitas habet rationem mensurae;" 114v: "Sed ultra notandum quod est mensurare secundum replicationem et mensurare secundum adaequationem. Dicitur ergo quod omne mensurare secundum adaequationem reperitur aeque primo in quantitate continua sicut discreta. Nam subiectum quantum mensuratur adaequate per suam quantitatem quo ad esse quantum, et aggregatum quo ad esse multum mensuratur adaequate per numerum. Sed mensurare secundum replicationem invenitur principalius in numeris,

If the *summum genus* of the category of quantity is a form, the seven species Aristotle enumerates (line, surface, solid, time, place, number, and speech) clearly are not. Alyngton tries to meet this difficulty (1) by reformulating the notion of quantified-thing (*quantum*), and (2) by proposing a method for deducing the seven species of quantity from the highest genus (a sort of *sufficientia quantitatum*). He considers the seven species Aristotle lists not as quantitative forms, but as the most proper and primary bearers of the quantitative nature, revealed by the highest genus of the category. In fact, encouraged by the Aristotelian distinction between strict and derivative quantities (*Categories* 6, 5a38–b10), like Burley,[69] he distinguishes two different ways of being quantified: by itself and *per accidens*. Only the seven species of quantity would be *quanta* by themselves, while any other quantum would be such *per accidens*, indirectly, because of its connection to one (or more) of the seven *quanta per se*.[70] In Alyngton's view, these seven species of quantity correspond to the seven possible ways of measuring the being (*esse*) of the material substance. In fact, substance has two main kinds of *esse*: permanent and in succession. And both of them can be either discrete or continuous. In turn, the *esse* permanent and continuous of material substance can be measured either from inside or from outside. If from inside, then in three different modes: according to one, two or all the three dimensions proper to material substances. In the first case, the measure is line, in the second surface, and in the third solid. If it is measured from outside, then it is place. The being of material substance that is permanent and discrete is measured by numbers. The being that is in succession and continuous is measured by time. And finally,

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cum ex numeris sciatur principaliter quotiens unum mensuratum contineat mensurans secundum replicationem."

[69] Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de quantitate*, fol. 29va.

[70] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de quantitate*, fol. 116r: "Notandum quod dupliciter dicuntur aliqua quanta. Primo per se, sicut quantitates absolutae superius numeratae. Secundo modo per accidens—quod potest esse tripliciter. Primo dicitur aliquid quantum per accidens quod est subiectum formaliter quantum per suam quantitatem quam subiectat. Et sic sola substantia materialis est quanta per quantitatem—sicut e contra quantitas est quanta per substantiam talem causaliter, sed non formaliter. Sed secundo modo dicitur quantum per accidens quod est accidens extensum per subiectum quantum. Et tertio modo dicitur aliquid quantum per accidens per respectum ad aliquid per se quantum, sicut angulus dicitur per accidens quantus in comparatione ad basim, et actio quanta in comparatione ad tempus. Et sic motus dicitur habere duplicem magnitudinem, permanentem scilicet et successivam. Et ita de aliis."

the being of substance that is in succession and discrete is measured by the quantity called 'speech' (*oratio*).[71]

Alyngton's derivation of the seven species of quantity from a unique principle common to them is unconvincing, but extremely interesting, nonetheless, as it clearly shows that he wants (1) to stress the unity of the category of quantity, which at first appears heterogeneous, and (2) to trace the problem of reality and real distinction of quantities back to that of the nature and status of its distinctive mark.

2. Aristotle's treatment of *ad aliquid* in the *Categories* is opaque and incomplete, since (1) he does not have any notion of relation, as he speaks of relatives and conceives of them as those entities to which non-absolute terms of our language refer; (2) he does not discuss the question of the reality of relatives; (3) he does not clarify the connection between the two definitions of relatives he proposes in the seventh chapters of the *Categories*; (4) he does not give any effective criterion for distinguishing relatives from some items belonging to other categories.[72] Because of these facts, in the late antiquity and in the Middle Ages many authors tried to reformulate the doctrine of relatives.

The most successful and interesting attempt was that of the Neoplatonic commentators of the sixth century, such as Olympiodorus and Simplicius. Unlike Aristotle, they were able to elaborate a notion of relation (*schesis*) almost equivalent to our modern notion of two-place predicates, as they conceived of relations as abstract forms whose distinctive feature was the property of being present-in and joining two

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[71] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de quantitate*, fol. 107r–v: "Sed ulterius pro divisione quantitatis est notandum quod substantia, quae est basis et fundamentum omnium aliorum generum, habet esse permanens et habet esse successivum. Esse autem permanens substantiae aut est continuum esse aut esse discretum. Et similiter esse successivum aut est continuum aut esse discretum. Omnis autem quantitas habet rationem mensurae. Aliqua ergo quantitas mensurat esse substantiae permanens et continuum: et hoc secundum unam dimensionem tantum, et sic est linea; aut secundum duas, et sic est superficies; aut secundum tres, et sic quantitas corporea, quae dicitur corpus de genere quantitatis. Potest enim corpus sumi vel pro substantia corporea vel pro quantitate molis, permanente, longa, lata et profunda, de qua nunc loquitur. Omnes tamen istae tres maneries quantitatum habent rationem mensurandi intrinsece…Secundum istos tres modos potest substantia quanta mensurari ab extrinseco, et sic est locus eius mensura, ut alius est locus linealis, et alius superficialis et alius corporeus. Sed esse substantiae permanens et discretum mensuratur per numerum. Et esse eius successivum et continuum mensuratur per tempus. Et esse eius successivum discretum per quantitatem mensuratur quae vocatur 'oratio'. Ita quod in permanentibus discretis est numerus, in successivis discretis oratio. Et sic patet sufficiens distinctio specierum quantitatis."

[72] Cf. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and De interpretatione*, pp. 98–103; and Julia Annas, *Aristotle's* Metaphysics: *Books* M *and* N (Oxford, 1976), p. 198.

different substances at once.[73] This view was rejected by Latin medieval authors. According to Boethius relation (*respectus* or *habitudo*) is an accidental form which is in a substance (its substrate of inherence) and simply entails a reference to another, without inhering in that other.[74] Albert the Great explicitly denied that a relation could inhere (in the technical sense of the word) in two substances at once.[75] Some years later, the same theses were held by Simon of Faversham.[76] Also Walter Burley shared this approach, since it appeared to him to be the only thing consistent with one of the basic principle of medieval metaphysics: the equivalence and correspondence between accidental forms and their substrates of inherence, so that no accidental form could inhere at the same time and in full in two (or more) substances.[77] On the contrary, Wyclif seems to support a different opinion, similar to that of the Neoplatonists, as he maintained that relation (1) is different from quality and quantity, since it presupposes them, and (2) *qua* such is a sort of link between two things.[78]

Alyngton's theory of *ad aliquid* is worthy of note, as he was the only late medieval author who followed and developed Wyclif's ideas on that topic. He conceived of relation (*relatio*) as an accidental form which is present in both the relatives at once—even though in different ways, since it names only one of them. Consequently his relation

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[73] For a more detailed discussion of Neoplatonic theory of relations see Françoise Caujolle-Zaslawsky, "Les relatifs dans les *Catégories*," in *Concepts et Catégories dans la pensée antique*, ed. Pierre Aubenque (Paris, 1980), pp. 167–195; Alessandro D. Conti, "La teoria della relazione nei commentatori neoplatonici delle *Categorie* di Aristotele," *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia* 38 (1983), 259–283; Concetta Luna, "La relation chez Simplicius," in *Simplicius: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa survie*, ed. Ilsetraut Hadot (Berlin, 1987), pp. 113–147.

[74] For a short analysis of Boethius' theory of *ad aliquid* see Alessandro D. Conti, "La teoria degli *ad aliquid* di Boezio: osservazioni sulla terminologia," in *Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Storia della Logica. San Gimignano, 4–8 dicembre 1982*, eds. V. M. Abrusci – E. Casari – M. Mugnai (Bologna, 1983), pp. 247–262.

[75] Cf. Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 4, cap. 10, pp. 240–241.

[76] Cf. Simon of Faversham, *Quaestiones in librum Praedicamentorum*, q. 43, pp. 137–138.

[77] Cf. Burley, *Expositio super librum Sex principiorum*, cap. *de habitu*, in *Expositio super Artem Veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* cit., fol. 63ra: "Intelligendum quod nullum accidens unum numero est simul secundum se totum in diversis subiective. Aliquod tamen accidens, ut numerus, est in diversis subiective secundum suas partes." On Burley's theory see Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary," pp. 165–170.

[78] Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 7, p. 61. On Wyclif's theory see Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 110–113.

can be considered as a sort of ontological counterpart of our modern functions with two variables, or two-place predicates.[79]

According to Alyngton, whose account partially differs from those of Burley and Wyclif, in the act of relating one substance to another four distinct constitutive elements can be singled out: (1) the relation itself—for instance, the form of paternity; (2) the subject of the relation, that is, the substance that denominatively receives the name of the relation—for instance, the (substance that is the) father; (3) the object of the relation, that is, the substance which the subject of the relation is connected with—for instance, the (substance that is the) son; and (4) the foundation (*fundamentum*) of the relation, that is, the absolute entity in virtue of which the relation inheres in the subject and in the object.[80] The foundation is the main component, since it (1) joins the relation to the underlying substances, (2) lets the relation link the substrate to the object, and (3) transmits some of its properties to the relation.[81] Like Wyclif,[82] Alyngton affirms that only qualities and quantities can be the foundation of a relation.[83]

Some consequences about the nature and status of relations and relatives derive from these premises: (1) relation is a categorial item whose reality is feebler than that of any other accidental form, as it depends upon the simultaneous existence of three different items: the subject, the object, and the foundation.[84] (2) A relation can start inhering in a substance without any change in the latter, but simply because of a change in another substance. For example: given two things, one white and the other black, if the black thing becomes white, then, because of this change, a new accident, that is, a relation of similarity, will inhere also in the first thing, apart from any other change in it. (3) All the true relatives (*relativa secundum esse*) are simultaneous by nature, since the real cause of being a relative is relation, which at the same time inheres in two substances, thereby making both ones relatives.[85]

On this basis Alyngton can divide relations into transcendental and categorial relations,[86] and, what is more, among the latter he can

[79] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, pp. 295–296.
[80] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 299.
[81] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 291.
[82] Cf. Wyclif, *De ente praedicamentali*, cap. 7, p. 67.
[83] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 291.
[84] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 295.
[85] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 301.
[86] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, pp. 290–291.

contrast real relatives (*relativa secundum esse*) with relatives of reason (*relativa rationis*) without utilizing references to our mental activities nor to semantic principles. In fact, on the one hand, Alyngton describes real relatives as those aggregates (1) made up of a primary substance, (2) an absolute accidental form (quantity or quality), and (3) a relation which correlates the substance at issue to another substance existing *in actu*. On the other hand, he define relatives of reason as those aggregates characterized by the occurrence of at least one of these negative conditions: (1) either the relation's subject of inherence or its object is not a substance; (2) the object is not an actual entity; (3) the foundation of the relation is not an absolute accident.[87] The strategy which supports this choice is evident: Alyngton wanted to substitute references to mental activity with references to the external world, thus using only objective criteria, based on the framework of reality itself in order to classifying things.

3. The chapter on quality is the least complex and interesting part of the whole commentary, since Alyngton is faithful to Aristotle's text and doctrine, and sometimes even offers rather unproblematic analyses and elucidations. The main general topic he deals with is the internal structure of the category.

In the first lines of the eighth chapter of the *Categories* (8a25–26) Aristotle observes that quality is among those things that are spoken of in a number of ways—an affirmation which seems to imply that quality is not a *summum genus*, as, according to Aristotle himself, what is spoken of in a number of ways always gathers in several different natures. Furthermore, the Stagirite speaks of four species of quality (habits and dispositions, natural capacities and incapacities, affective qualities and affections, figures and shapes), without explaining how they are related to one another and to the highest genus of the category. No Aristotelian commentator had ever thought that quality was spoken of in many ways purely equivocally. Therefore no Aristotelian commentator had ever presumed that the term 'quality' could have several different (but connected) meanings. On the contrary, they unanimously took for granted that it had a unique *ratio*, common to all the items belonging to the category. They disagreed, however, about the status and hierarchical order of the four species mentioned by Aristotle. For example, Albert the Great held that quality at once and directly splits

[87] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de relativis*, p. 293.

up into the four species, which would all be equally far from the highest genus.[88] Duns Scotus,[89] Ockham,[90] and Walter Burley[91] maintained that the so called 'species' of the quality were not properly species (or intermediate genera), but modes of quality, since many singular qualities would belong to the first three species at the same time, as, unlike species, modes are not constituted by opposite properties. Alyngton rejected both opinions. The latter because it compromises the actual goal of a correct categorial theory,[92] and the former because it does not fit in with the standard infracatagorial structure described by Porphyry in his *Isagoge*. Consequently, he inserts an intermediate level between the highest genus of the category and the four species by claiming that quality is first of all divided into perceptible (*sensibilis*) and non-perceptible (*insensibilis*) qualities. Affective qualities and affections, figures and shapes stem from the former kind of quality, while habits and dispositions, natural capacities and incapacities derive from the latter. In fact, (1) figures and shapes are those perceptible qualities which inhere in substances because of the mutual position of its quantitative parts, while affective qualities and affections inhere in substances because of the form itself of the substantial composite. (2) Natural capacities and incapacities are inborn non-perceptible qualities, while habits and dispositions are due to the activity, both physical and, if it is the case, intellectual, of the substance in which they inhere.[93]

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[88] Cf. Albert the Great, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tr. 5, cap. 2, pp. 245–248.

[89] Cf. Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Praedicamenta*, q. 36, pp. 497–499.

[90] Cf. Ockham, *Expositio in librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis*, cap. 14.4, p. 271.

[91] Cf. Burley, *Expositio super Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, cap. *de qualitate*, fol. 38vb: "Illa quae hic ponuntur species qualitatis non sunt species ex opposito distinctae, quomodo distinguuntur homo et asinus, sed 'species' accipitur in proposito pro modo. Unde quattuor sunt species qualitatis, id est: quattuor sunt modi qualitatis, qui modi non sunt ex opposito distincti. Nam idem numero non continetur sub speciebus ex opposito distinctis; sed idem numero est in prima specie qualitatis, in secunda et in tertia; ergo illae species non sunt oppositae."

[92] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de qualitate*, fol. 130r: "Sed melius et consonantius est dicere quod istae species distinguuntur ex opposito, ita quod nihil quod est per se in una specie est per se in alia specie."

[93] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de qualitate*, fol. 130r: "Pro quo est notandum quod omnis qualitas aut est active sensibilis aut insensibilis. Insensibilium autem qualitatum aliquae sunt maturaliter acquisibiles vel naturaliter inexistentes, et omnes tales et solum tales dicuntur esse in secunda specie qualitatis; sed aliae sunt insensibiles praeternaturaliter solum acquisibiles immediate per actionem, cuiusmodi sunt habitus corporei, ut sanitas et infirmitas, et habitus spirituales, ut virtutes morales vel intellectuales, quae omnes sunt insensibiles, quamvis occasionaliter sensu possunt percipi. Sunt etiam ex arte et usu acquisibiles, quamvis aliqua sit sanitias connaturata animali. Nec generantur istae qualitates a sibi similibus immediate, sed per transmutationem in qualitatibus primis

Concluding Remarks

As the preceding analyses show, Alyngton's theory of categories is an interesting example of that partial dissolution of the traditional doctrine which took place in between the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries. Within Alyngton's metaphysics, (1) the relationships between primary (or individual) substances and secondary (or universal) substances, and (2) between substances and accidents (both abstract and concrete) as well as (3) the inner natures of essential and accidental predications are so different from their Aristotelian originals that the general meaning of the categorial doctrine is deeply modified. According to Alyngton, the formal-and-essential predication and the formal-and-accidental predication would correspond to Aristotle's essential and accidental predications respectively. But he regards remote inherence as more general than formal predication. Therefore, in his system formal predication is a sort of sub-type of the remote inherence. This means that he recognises a single ontological pattern, founded on a partial identity, as the basis of every kind of predicative relation. Thus, the *praedicatio formalis essentialis* and the *praedicatio formalis accidentalis* are very different from their Aristotelian models, as they express degrees in identity as well as the remote inherence. As a consequence, the relationships between substance and accidents and between individuals and universals (and hence the ontological status of universal substances and that of accidents) are completely changed. In Alyngton's view, both concrete accidents, *qua* modes of individual substances, and universal substances, *qua* the main components of the natures of individual substances, are really identical-to and formally distinct-from primary substances. Moreover, in the *Categories* Aristotle (1) characterizes primary substances as those beings which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, and (2) considers the capacity of underlying accidents as the constitutive principle of substance, while Alyngton (1) defines primary substance as what (i) is apt to underlie potency and act, and (ii) has matter and form as its inner foundations, and (2) explicitly affirms that underlying accidents is only a derivative property of substance. Finally, because of his strong propensity towards

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vel aliter per actiones animae. Et ista sunt in prima specie qualitatis. Si autem sint qualitates sensibiles vel consequuntur positionem quantitatis, et sic sunt in quarta specie, vel insunt absolute ratione formae et non ratione positionis quantitatis, et sic sunt in tertia specie."

hypostatization (as we have seen, Alyngton methodically replaces logical and epistemological rules with ontological criteria and references), he interprets Aristotle's theory of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy as an ontological theory about real items and not as a semantic one about the relations between terms and things.

In conclusion, Alyngton conflates the real and "logical" (so to say) levels into one: like Burley and Wyclif, he considers logic as (1) *the* theory of *the* discourse on being (*ens*), (2) turning on structural forms and relations, which exist in the world and are totally independent of the mental acts by which they are grasped. It is through these structural forms and relations that the network connecting the basic items of reality (individuals and universals, substances and accidents) is clearly disclosed. Yet, because of his peculiar ideas on substance and predication, his world is different from those of Burley and of Wyclif.

On Burley's view, macro-objects (i.e., what is signified by a proper name or by an individual expression, such as 'Socrates' or 'this particular horse') are the basic components of the world.[94] They are aggregates made up of really different items: primary substances and substantial and accidental forms existing in them. Primary substances and substantial and accidental forms are like simple (or atomic) objects, each possessing a unique, well-defined nature. Although they are simple, some of these components are in a sense composite because they are reducible to something else—for example, primary substance is composed of a particular form and matter. Primary substance differs from the other components of a macro-object because of its peculiar mode of being as an autonomous and independently existing object—in contrast with the other categorial items, which necessarily presuppose it for their existence. Primary substances are therefore substrates of existence in relation to everything else. The distinction between substantial and accidental forms derives from their different relations to primary substances: substantial, universal forms disclose the natures of primary substances; by contrast, those forms that simply affect primary substances without being actually joined to their natures are accidental forms. As a result, the macro-object is not simply a primary substance but an orderly collection of categorial items, so that primary substance,

[94] On Burley's ontology of the macro-objects see Conti, "Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary on the *Ars Vetus*," pp. 121–176; and also Alessandro D. Conti, "Significato e verità in Walter Burley," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 11 (2000), 317–350.

even though it is the most important element, does not contain the whole being of the macro-object.

On Wyclif's view, whatever is is a proposition (pan-propositionalism).[95] The constitutive property of any kind of being is the capacity of being the object of a complex act of signifying (*omne ens est primarie significabile per complexum*). This choice implies a revolution in the standard medieval theory of transcendentals, since Wyclif actually replaces being with true. According to the common belief, *verum* was nothing but being itself considered in relation to an intellect, no matter whether divine or human. According to Wyclif, being is no more the main transcendental and its notion is not the first and simplest, but there is something more basic to which being can be brought back: the truth (*veritas*) (or true—*verum*). Only what can be signified by a complex expression is a being, and whatever is the proper object of an act of signifying is a truth. 'Truth' is therefore the true name of being itself. From the ontological point of view this entails the uniqueness in type of the *significata* of every class of categorematic expressions. Within Wyclif's world it is the same (kind of) object which both concrete terms and propositions refer to, as primary substances have to be regarded as (atomic) states of affairs. According to him, from the metaphysical point of view a singular man (*iste homo*) is nothing but a real proposition (*propositio realis*), where the actual existence in time as an individual (*ista persona*) plays the role of subject, the common nature, i.e., human nature (*natura humana*), plays the role of predicate, and the singular essence (*essentia istius hominis*), that is what by means of which this individual is a man, plays the role of the copula. The result is that Wyclif's world consists of molecular objects, which are not simple, but composite, because they are reducible to something else, belonging to a different rank of reality, and unable to exist by itself: being and essence, potency and act, matter and form, abstract genera, species and differences. For that reason, everything one can speak about or think of is both a thing (or molecular object) and a sort of atomic state of affairs, while every true proposition expresses either an atomic or a molecular state of affairs, that is the union (if the proposition is affirmative) or the separation (if the proposition is negative) of two (or more) molecular objects.

[95] On Wyclif's pan-propositionalism see Laurent Cesalli, "Le 'pan-propositionnalisme' de Jean Wyclif," *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 124–155; and Conti, "Wyclif's Logic and Metaphysics," pp. 78–86.

On the contrary, Alyngton's world consists of atomic objects whose constitutive elements are (1) abstract forms (or essences), both substantial and accidental, (2) potency and act, and (3) matter. In fact, according to him, unlike Burley, (1) what is signified by a proper name or by an individual expression is a primary substance, and, unlike Wyclif, (2) simple and complex expressions have different *significata*.[96] Moreover, in his view, Socrates cannot be regarded as an aggregate, since the beings of the substantial universal forms predicated of him and those of the concrete accidental forms inhering in him *coincide* with the being of that primary substance Socrates himself is. Thus, if we consider Socrates from the point of view of his being, Socrates is simply an atomic object, a primary substance. If we consider him from the point of view of the essences that he contains in himself, then he is a compound of really different forms, which can exist only in it, as its components, and through its being. This is the inner sense (1) of the formula 'really identical and formally distinct' that Alyngton employs for explaining the relation between universals and individuals as well as the relation between substance and concrete accidents; and (2) of his description of the nature and peculiar mode of being of the primary substance: to be a primary substance is to be *the being* of whatever can be.

[96] Cf. Alyngton, *In Cat.*, cap. *de complexo et incomplexo*, pp. 248–250.