

GILES OF ROME'S QUESTIONS ON THE METAPHYSICS

Alessandro D. Conti

Giles of Rome (Aegidius Romanus), O.E.S.A. (Rome, ca.1243–Avignon, 1316) was one of the most important and well known theologians active at the end of the 13th century and the beginning of the 14th.¹ He brought to completion Aquinas's shift from Augustine's approach in philosophy to Aristotle's and heavily influenced the philosophical and theological orientation of his Order.²

Until the 1960s, he had been described as a Thomist, a judgment that nowadays scholars resolutely deny. Indeed, despite his general agreement with him on many points, Giles can scarcely be represented as a disciple of Thomas Aquinas, since it is evident that he agreed with Thomas as a result of original considerations. He was an independent thinker who worked out his own theories, using Thomas's doctrines as starting points for his own. Moreover, very often the arguments he uses for supporting the theses he shares with Aquinas are different from those employed by

¹ On Giles's life and works, see Francesco del Punta, Silvia Donati, & Concetta Luna, "Egidio Romeno," in: AA.VV., *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani*, vol. 42 (Rome, 1993), pp. 319–41. For a short but complete introduction to his thought, see Roberto Lambertini, "Giles of Rome," in: Edward N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition)* <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/giles/>>. On his metaphysical doctrines, see Edagr Hocedez, "Gilles de Rome et Henri de Gand sur la distinction réelle (1276–87)," *Gregorianum* 8 (1927), 358–84; Marcel Chossat, "L'averroïsme de St. Thomas. Notes sur la distinction d'essence et d'existence à la fin du XIII siècle," *Archives de philosophie* 9 (1932), 130–77; Jean O. Paulus, "Les disputes d'Henri de Gand et Gilles de Rome sur la distinction de l'essence et de l'existence," *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 15–17 (1940–42), 323–58; Peter W. Nash, "Giles of Rome on Boethius' *Diversum est esse et id quod est*," *Mediaeval Studies* 12 (1950), 57–91; Peter W. Nash, "The Accidentality of *esse* According to Giles of Rome," *Gregorianum* 38 (1957), 103–15; Girolamo Trapé, "Esse partecipato e distinzione reale in Egidio Romeno," *Aquinas* 12 (1969), 443–68; John F. Wippel, "The Relationship between Essence and Existence in Late Thirteenth Century Thought: Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and James of Viterbo," in: Parviz Morewedge, ed., *Philosophies of Existence: Ancient and Medieval* (New York, 1982), pp. 131–64; Silvia Donati, "La dottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romeno," *Medioevo* 14 (1988), 149–233; and Giorgio Pini, "La dottrina della creazione e la ricezione delle opere di Tommaso d'Aquino nelle *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* (qq. 1–7) di Egidio Romeno," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 3 (1992), 271–304.

² In 1287 at Florence, the general chapter of the Hermits of St. Augustine decreed that Giles's works, not only in regard to what he had already written but even the future ones, should be considered as the official doctrine of the Order.

the Dominican Master. And finally, he did not hesitate to correct and, sometimes, sharply criticize Aquinas's opinions in significant aspects.

Among Giles's many Aristotelian commentaries, the *Quaestiones metaphysicales* is an early work: the *reportatio* made by a student of a course of lessons given by Giles, probably in the years in between 1269 and 1272,³ when Giles was a young bachelor in theology at Paris, during Aquinas's second teaching period there. He commented on only a few books (the first, second, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth, tenth, and eleventh) and to an uneven extent, as he discusses 27 questions related to the first book, 22 to the second, 14 to the fourth, two to the sixth, 12 to the seventh, five to the eighth, six to the tenth, and three to the eleventh.⁴ His commentary is lacking in real doctrinal focus, is very short, and, in some respect, is quite superficial and unproblematic. The Venetian edition of 1499, the oldest of the four Venetian editions which reproduce the text of this commentary, consists of no more than 38 folios. As many as 49 of its 91 questions concern the first two books of the *Metaphysics*, which constitute a sort of introduction to the work, since the first book illustrates the notion of a scientific discipline which deals with the first principles or causes of things and draws a brief history of the subject, and the second is a rapid methodological preamble, which deals with some themes connected with the notion of truth. As a result, Giles's commentary discusses few really metaphysical topics and appears to be devoted to articulating a sort of meta-discourse on the object (or subject-matter—*subiectum*), goal (*finis*), boundaries, and nature of the metaphysical science as well. Nonetheless, it is possible to draw from it some hints for reconstructing Giles's (early) metaphysical view.

The main sources of the work appears to be Avicenna's *Liber de philosophia prima* and Averroes's commentary on the *Metaphysics*, which are cited in many questions but also frequently corrected and sometimes openly criticized. As far as Aquinas's writings are concerned, Giles shows himself to be acquainted with Thomas's main philosophical theses, but he quotes Aquinas's opinions very infrequently and always *ad sensum*.

In what follows I will offer a (tentatively systematic) glimpse into Giles's (early) metaphysical system together with an account of his conception of metaphysics as a scientific discipline. So the first section of the chapter will briefly deal with metaphysics seen as the science of being *qua* being.

³ Cf. Silvia Donati, "Studi per una cronologia delle opere di Egidio Romeno. I: Le opere prima del 1285. I commenti aristotelici," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 1 (1990), 1–111, esp. 14–32.

⁴ See the list of the 91 questions in the Appendix.

The second section will concern Giles's theory of analogy, which is the logical counterpart of his doctrine of being. In the third section, I shall focus on Giles's main ideas about the metaphysical composition of substances and shall sketch his peculiar solution to the question of the composition of essence and being. The fourth section will be about the notion of truth. And finally, in the last section I shall draw some conclusions about the general significance of Giles's (early) conception of the world.

1. METAPHYSICS AS A SCIENCE

As is well known, in the first book of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle describes primary philosophy as a science which studies the explanatory principles and causes of everything (A 2, 982b7–9), whilst in the fourth book he speaks of it in terms of a science which investigates being *qua* being and the attributes belonging to it in virtue of its own nature (Γ 1, 1003a21–22). Yet, in Book VI he seems to argue that primary philosophy is (a form of) theology, in that it is mainly about divine being (E 1, 1026a27–32). So in his commentary, Giles tackles the question as to whether the object of the metaphysical investigation is God (I, q. 5), or the four causes (I, q. 11), or being *qua* being (IV, q. 1). His answer is that being *qua* being is the object of metaphysics (*ens secundum quod ens est subiectum istius scientiae*).

He argues that any science whose object of inquiry is a particular kind of being, such as the mobile being (*ens mobile ad ubi*), is itself particular, since sciences derive their own features from the features proper to their objects. But metaphysics is the most comprehensive among sciences. Therefore, its object must be the most general of all. And that is being. Moreover, being must be considered from the most universal and abstract point of view, since metaphysics is also the most abstract among sciences. Therefore, metaphysics must abstract from any type of matter as well as from the particular aspects of beings (namely, those things that can be said to be) and must consider them merely *qua* beings, without any other qualification. Natural science and mathematics also study being, but in different ways and under different aspects. Natural philosopher studies being, insofar as it is subject to the laws of nature and insofar it is that which moves and undergoes changes. The mathematician studies being *qua* abstract from matter, but insofar as it is countable and measurable.⁵ This does not mean that metaphysics does not deal with God at all. Giles

⁵ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones metaphysicales*, IV, q. 1 (Venice, 1499), fol. c6rb (hereafter *Qu. Met.*).

explains that we can distinguish between the main object of a science considered by itself and properly (*subiectum principale per se et primo*) and the object of a science considered in a derivative way (*ex consequenti*). Being *qua* being is the object of metaphysics by itself and properly, but God is the main object of metaphysics in a derivative way, since the *ratio entis* is better realized in God himself than in any other being—namely, God *is* in the strictest sense of the term, since essence and being are the same in Him, and any other being *is* only insofar as it shares the being of God in accordance with its own nature.⁶

Finally, the four causes cannot be the object of inquiry of metaphysics because the subject-matter of a science is what is taken into consideration by that science, but the four causes *as such* cannot be taken into consideration by any science. In fact, causes (as such) are that by which something is proved (by a science) about something else, while the proper object of a science is that about which something is proved. As a consequence, although being the cause of something and being the object of a science are not absolutely incompatible properties, causes as such cannot be the object of any science because, in this particular case, they should be the causes of themselves.⁷

2. BEING AND ANALOGY

The point of departure of Giles's metaphysics is the notion of being (*ens*), which occupies the central place in his ontology—as we have seen. Given that the *Quaestiones metaphysicales* was written far before Duns Scotus worked out his theory of the univocity of being, in this work there is no discussion of Scotus's thesis (which, in contrast, was full of important consequences for the development of 14th-century philosophy), and the treatment of the topic is in line with the 13th-century realist tradition.

As is well known, in the Middle Ages the real issue was the knotty theological problem of the relationship among the notion of being, God, and

⁶ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, I, q. 5, fol. a3rb–va. See also *Theoremata de esse et essentia*, th. 19, ed. Edgar Hocedez (Leuven, 1930), pp. 127 and 134; and *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 9 (Venice, 1503), fol. 20vb; q. 11, fol. 24vb; q. 12, fols. 27rb and 29ra.

⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 11, fol. a5va–b: "Subiectum in scientia est illud de quo probatur aliquid in scientia; causa autem, secundum quod causa, est illud per quod probatur aliquid in scientia de subiecto; cum ergo esse illud de quo aliquid probatur (probari *ed.*) et esse illud per quod aliquid probatur in scientia sint rationes penitus diversae, patet quod, licet illud quod est causa possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae, tamen causa secundum quod causa non est subiectum alicuius scientiae."

creatures. Yet, in his *Metaphysics* (Δ 2, 1003a33–35), Aristotle raises the general problem of the word “being” and its different senses in relation to the categorial items only. He denies that “being” is a merely equivocal term, for all the many senses (*rationes*, in Latin) according to which “being” can be said of are related to a single sense, that in which substance is said to be. Although Giles devotes two questions to the analogy of being (the third and fourth of Book IV), he has little to say about analogy as such. What is more, as a faithful interpreter of Aristotle’s thought, he is only concerned with the problem of the relation among being, substance, and accidents and does not examine the theological implications of the theory.

In discussing the first question, whether being is equivocal or analogous (*utrum ens sit aequivocum an analogum*), the Italian master mentions two different divisions of analogy. The first was common in the second half of the 13th century and is inspired by Aristotle’s treatment of equivocity in the *Sophistical Refutations*;⁸ while the second, which is simpler but more effective, is Giles’s own. The general premise of both divisions is that equivocation, univocation, and analogy depend on the ways according to which the form, or forms, signified by the term at issue are related to the things to which the term refers.⁹ If there are two or more forms connected with the term, it is equivocal.¹⁰ If there is only one form, the term may be univocal or analogous. It is totally (*penitus*) univocal if the form is present in all the things in the same way (*aequaliter*); otherwise it is analogous. In their turn, analogous terms are divided into three sub-types. The first kind of analogy is very similar to univocity (as a matter of fact, it satisfies the conditions for univocity as traditionally defined on the basis of the first chapter of the *Categories*), since the form at issue is equally present in all the things that participate in it, but the things themselves are not precisely of the same type (or kind), since some of them are more perfect than the others. For instance, men and dogs participate equally in the

⁸ Cf. E. Jennifer Ashworth, “Medieval Theories of Analogy,” in: Edward N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition)* <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/en-tries/analogy-medieval/>>.

⁹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. c6vb: “Ad istam quaestionem est intelligendum quod tota ratio aequivocationis sumitur ex forma; unde et Philosophus vocat formam quod quid est. Et in II *Physicorum* dicitur quod forma est ratio essendi. Unde ipsa definitio datur per formam. Unde etsi in definitione ponatur materia, hoc non est nisi in quantum materia participat naturam formae et in quantum est sub forma.”

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. c6vb: “Unde si aliquod nomen imponatur pluribus per comparisonem ad diversas formas, tunc, cum tota ratio aequivocationis sumitur ex forma, illud nomen dicitur de eis aequivoce.”

form of animality but are not themselves equal, since men are much more perfect than dogs. This type of analogy is characteristic of (natural) genera only and was introduced in response to Aristotle's observation that many equivocations are hidden in a genus.¹¹ A second kind of analogy is very close to equivocity (as a matter of fact, it coincides with Boethius's first subdivision of equivocation).¹² Analogous in this sense are those things which happen to have the same name, but the form signified by the name is really present only in some of the things to which the term refers, while it is attributed to the others because of their likeness (*similitudo*) in relation to the former. According to Giles, an example of this kind of analogy is the noun "animal" when it is said of both real animals and pictured animals. The latter are called animals not because the form of animality is really present in them but because their external shape is the same as that of living animals.¹³ The third kind of analogy is intermediary between equivocity and pure univocity. Those terms are analogical in the sense that they have only one form signified by them, but the things to which the terms refer participate in the form itself in different ways (i.e., *simpli-citer* and *secundum quid*). "Being" is such a term, since substance alone is in an absolute way, whereas accidents *are* only in virtue of their relations to substance, and so derivatively.¹⁴

In Giles's opinion, the second partition he mentions is closer to Aristotle's intention. According to this partition, terms are divided into equivocal, univocal, and analogical. Those terms are equivocal which are matched by two or more forms, while those terms to which one form only corresponds are univocal or analogous. If the form is directly present in all the things to which the term refers, then there is univocity. If the form is directly present in some of the things to which the term refers and not in all of them, and it can be attributed to those in which it is not present in an indirect way, then there is analogy. "Being" is such an analogous term, since the form signified by it, namely, entity (*entitas*), is directly

¹¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Physics*, H 3, 249a22–25.

¹² Cf. Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quattuor*, in: *Patrologia Cursus Completus, Series latina*, ed. Jacques-P. Migne (Paris, 1844–1902), t. 64.

¹³ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. d1ra. This example is that analyzed by Aristotle in the first chapter of the *Categorias*. As E. Jennifer Ashworth remarks in the above-quoted "Medieval Theories of Analogy," medieval logicians were unaware of the fact that the Greek word employed by Aristotle, and translated as 'animal' by Boethius, was genuinely polysemous, meaning both animal and image.

¹⁴ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 3, fol. d1ra.

present in substance only and not in the accidents, which, in relation to being, are the analogical things (*analogia*).¹⁵

Giles maintains that the things which are said to be analogical in this sense are said to be such in relation to a form which is, in principle, one in number if considered by itself and in relation to them (namely, those things in which the form is not directly present)—even if it is actually multiplied in many things at once (namely, those where it is directly present), and so it is one in species in relation to the latter.¹⁶ In order to better understand such claims, which look inconsistent at a first glance, it is necessary to keep in mind that (1) accidents are caused by primary substances¹⁷ and properly inhere only in them, which are individual and so one in number; and (2) everything which properly belongs to a primary substance is *ipso facto* individual, or individualized, and so one in number.¹⁸

3. THE METAPHYSICAL COMPOSITION OF PARTICULAR SUBSTANCES

Giles is a realist, since for him the structure of scientific explanation mirrors the composition of the reality for which it accounts. The main problem of every medieval realist metaphysics was that of the metaphysical composition of individual substances, which is at the confluence of the main ontological problems at issue in that period: the relationships

¹⁵ *Ibid.*: “Sed si nos vellemus dare aliam distinctionem, possemus sic dicere, et melius credo, ad intentionem Philosophi: nam, sicut dictum est, tota ratio aequivocationis sumitur ex forma, et ideo si sit diversitas in forma erit aequivocatio, sicut dictum est. Si autem sit unitas (veritas *ed.*) in forma, aut est unitas (veritas *ed.*) formae per praedicationem aut est unitas (veritas *ed.*) formae per attributionem. Et est intelligendum quod quando est unitas (veritas *ed.*) formae per praedicationem, tunc est univocatio. Quando autem est unitas (veritas *ed.*) formae per attributionem, tunc erit analogia. [...] Quando aliqua plura sunt talia per aliquid quod est in eis, tunc est unitas per praedicationem; et est univocatio. [...] Sed quando aliqua plura sunt talia non per aliquid quod est in eis, sed per aliquid quod est in alio, tunc non dicuntur talia univoce, sed analogice. Sicut omnia entia dicuntur esse entia non per aliquid quod est in eis, sed per aliquid quod est in alio, sicut in substantia. Unde etsi accidentia dicuntur esse entia, hoc non est per entitatem quae est in eis, sed per entitatem quae est in substantia, sicut patebit in VII huius. Et ideo ens analogice dicitur et non aequivocae. Et hoc videtur esse intentio Philosophi, si aliquis bene consideret.”

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, IV, q. 4, fol. dirb.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 1, fol. d5ra: “Item, illum dictum Philosophi aut intelligitur de accidente simpliciter aut de illo accidente quod est in substantia a qua causatur.”

¹⁸ This is true only for material substances, given that separate substances are not properly individual and one in number, because of the absence of the general form of quantity in them—see *Qu. Met.*, IV, q. 10, fol. d3rb–va.

between essence and being, between universals and particulars, between substance and accidents, and the process of individuation. Individuation is, in a certain sense, the synthesis of all of them, since the question at stake—namely, how to explain the derivation of individuals (i.e., things that are self-subsistent and unique, existing here and now, and, in the case of material substances, capable of affecting our senses) from common natures, which are, by contrast, existentially incomplete and dependent, and accessible only to thought—is closely connected with all the others, and so the solution to the problem of individuation affects all the others. Most of the questions of Book VII—especially the seventh one, on whether particulars can be defined—deal with such topics. Giles's point of view in treating all this matter is epistemological rather than metaphysical, for his main concern seems to be to clarify *how* we can reach a proper understanding of the various levels of reality and of the different relationships among the elementary constituents of the world.

The distinction between things which exist in the primary way, namely, substances, and things which exist in a derivative way, namely, accidents, is one of the cornerstones of Giles's metaphysics. Accidents depend upon substances and have a feebler entity than substances.¹⁹ Both substances and accidents are simple entities;²⁰ however, particular substances (or *res*) are in a sense composite because they are reducible to something else, i.e., essence and existence,²¹ and have *partes reales*, i.e., matter and form, which are really different from the composite substance.²² Even though all the accidents inhere in substance because of the matter and form taken together,²³ the main component of substance is its form (*forma*), or essence (*essentia*), or quiddity (*quidditas* or *quid est*). In fact, according to Giles, who echoes the first chapter of the *De ente et essentia* of Aquinas, all these terms—"form," "essence," and "quiddity"—refer to the same entity considered from different points of view. The form is an abstract entity by itself, common to a multiplicity of individuals (*particularia*, according to Giles's terminology), and so it has a definition in the strict sense of the term (*vera et propria definitio*) that particulars do not have, because

¹⁹ Cf., for instance, Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, VI, q. 2, fols. d4vb–d5ra.

²⁰ An item is said to be simple if and only if either it has no constituent parts, like the *summa genera*, or if its constituent parts cannot subsist separately.

²¹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 7, fol. e2ra.

²² *Ibid.*, q. 9, fol. e2vb: "Res secundum suum esse actuale habet partes reales, scilicet materia et forma, quae sunt partes compositi. [...] Nam pars realis realiter differt a suo toto, et ideo non praedicatur de ipso."

²³ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 8, fol. e2rb.

of the necessary presence in them of matter determined by dimensive quantity (*materia signata*). Such a *materia signata* acts as the principle of individuation, insofar as it multiplies substantial forms and individualizes them.²⁴ On the contrary, accidents do not have a true definition, since their being is not separated from that of substance,²⁵ and consequently in their peculiar form of definition (*per additamentum*) it is necessary to add an explicit reference to their substrate of inherence (*subiectum*).²⁶ The final result is that in the definition of accidents the relationship between genus and difference is just the opposite of that holding between them in the definition of substance. In fact, the genus is not the potential part of the definition and the difference the actual one, as it happens in the substances. Quite the reverse: it is the genus which is the actual part, as it contains a reference to the subject, while the difference acts as the potential part which needs to be determined. For instance, according to Giles, when we defined *simus* as *nasus cavus*, *cavus*, which is the difference, is determined (and so actualized) by *nasus*, which is the genus.²⁷

As is well known, Thomas Aquinas had postulated a real composition of essence and *esse* in creatures, in order to account for the dependence of the world upon God at a merely philosophical level. He thought that because the essence of a creature receives its being from God, essence and being are distinct from each other, but related one to the other just as potency (essence) and act (being). Giles pursued the same line of thought, as he admitted a distinction between essence and being as between two things. The clearest exposition of his view is set in a passage from his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, where he states that every material substance has three different levels of being: categorial (*esse in praedicamento*), propositional (*esse rei quod dicit veritatem propositionis*), and actual (*esse actuale rei*).²⁸ The first one is the potential being that

²⁴ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 7, fol. e1va–b; and VIII, q. 5, fol. e6rb–va.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 2, fol. d5va.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 2, fol. d5rb.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 2, fol. d5va–b.

²⁸ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Super Analytica Posteriora*, II (Venice, 1488), fol. n1rb–va: “Dicendum quod possumus distinguere triplex esse. [...] Est autem primum esse rei per quod res est in praedicamento. [...] Tale esse potest competere rei ea non existente actualiter; ut non existente rosa in actu, verum est de ea quod sit res praedicamenti <substantiae>. [...] Ad tale autem esse sufficit quod res sit in suis causis, quia si est in suis causis, cum scire sit per causas, de ea poterit esse scientia. [...] Ergo quod habet tale esse, videlicet in suis causis, est res praedicamenti, et de eo potest esse scientia, et de eo possunt formari propositiones verae. [...] Est autem secundum esse rei quod dicit veritatem propositionis. Et tale esse praesupponit primum esse. Primo enim intelligitur quod aliquid sit res

everything has in its causes, both universal (genus, species) and particular. This level of reality is closely connected with the essence of the singular substance and is independent of its actual existence. It is what Giles sometimes calls “essential being” (“esse essentiae”) as well. It is the object of the act of simple apprehension and is presupposed by any other level of being of the thing.²⁹ The propositional being is any state of a thing designated by a declarative sentence, like “*homo est animal*” or “*Sortes est albus*.”³⁰ It is the object of the act of judging. Finally, the actual being is the actual existence in time of a finite being as an earthly thing. It is the kind of being to which sense-cognition testifies.

In his *Quaestiones metaphysicales*, however, Giles seems to hold a simplified doctrine in relation to the more mature one. In fact, he distinguishes two main kinds of being, the *esse essentiale* (or *esse essentiae*) and the *esse actuale*. The first kind of being is proper to universals and the second to the particulars considered as such.³¹ Thus, in Giles’s view, the essence and the essential being of a thing are one and the same reality considered from two diverse points of view. The *esse essentiale* of a given thing is nothing but the specific form (or essence) considered together with its own mode of being. It is something real, while the genus, from which, in a certain way, it derives, exists only as the potential part of the specific form and cannot be apart from it. So, genera can exist only *qua* constitutive parts of species.³² What plays a dominant role in this process is the difference (no matter whether generic or specific), as it is the formal principle (*ratio*) which causes the passage from a categorial item to its inferior in the *linea praedicamentalis*.³³

praedicamenti et quod habeat habitudines ad debita principia et ad debitas proprietates, et postea de tali re formentur propositiones verae. Propositio ergo vera explicat illas habitudines quas res habet. Tale autem esse quod dicit veritatem propositionis demonstratio concludit. [...] Tertium autem esse est esse actuale rei. Hoc autem per accidens se habet ad demonstrationem. Probat enim demonstrator quod tringulus habet tres <angulos>, quod est figura plana etc., et forte nihil tale est in actu, quia forte nihil est omnino planum vel nihil omnino rectum.”

²⁹ Cf. also Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 5, fol. e1ra.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 5, fol. e1ra–b.

³¹ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 7, fol. e2ra: “Dicendum quod duplex est esse, scilicet essentiale et esse actuale. Esse vero essentiale est magis proprium speciei et universalium, esse autem actuale proprium individuorum, quoniam individua sunt proprie quae corrumpuntur secundum esse actuale. Universale autem non corrumpitur secundum esse sibi proprium, scilicet secundum esse essentiae, sed corrumpitur secundum accidens, scilicet in quantum esse actuale individuo<rum> corrumpitur.”

³² *Ibid.*, VII, q. 2, fol. d5rb.

³³ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 5, fol. e1ra.

Giles's account of the composition of finite beings tacitly identifies the opposition between essence and being, which was fundamental in the philosophical and theological systems of the end of the 13th century, with the opposition between universals and individuals. Giles thinks of the essence as a universal form and the existence (taken in the strict sense, as being in act) as the mode of being proper to primary substances. Thus, at this point of his intellectual development, Giles seems to maintain that between essence and existence there is the same kind of distinction which holds between universals and individuals. The universality, namely, the property of being apt to be present in many things and to be predicated of them, is possessed only potentially by substantial forms, even instantiated by particulars, and it is because of an intervention of the human mind that this property becomes wholly actual, as the individual substances considered in themselves are intelligible only *in potentia*.³⁴

As a consequence, the most important results of such an approach to the question of the metaphysical composition of the finite (corporeal) beings seem to be the following three: (1) extension of the range of the notion of being; (2) distinction between being and existence, as the former is the universal condition of every kind of reality and the latter the mode of being peculiar to individual substances only; and (3) a sort of assimilation of the distinction between essence and existence to the distinction between universal and singular.

4. TRUTH

Many of the 22 questions of the second book are devoted to the notion of truth and the process of understanding.³⁵ Giles defines truth in the same way as Aquinas in his *De veritate*, "veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei,"³⁶ but then interprets this definition in a different manner. When Aquinas speaks of *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, he tries to embrace and combine into an unique formula and doctrine the two opposite approaches of Anselm and of Aristotle: in his view, truth is really present in both the things and the intellect. In contrast, Giles thinks that truth is in the intellect only and

³⁴ *Ibid.*, VII, q. 9, fol. e2vb.

³⁵ On Giles's theory of knowledge, see Alessandro D. Conti, "Intelletto ed astrazione nella teoria della conoscenza di Egidio Romeno," *Bullettino dell'Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medioevo e Archivio muratoriano* 95 (1989), 123–64, and "Conoscenza e verità in Egidio Romeno," *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 3 (1992), 305–61.

³⁶ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 1, fol. b3vb.

denies that it is really present in the things—so he seems to exclude that the relation of adequation (or correspondence) that holds between the intellect and the things is symmetrical. According to him, truth, conceived as a real relation of correspondence between two objects, is only present in our intellects, not in the things.³⁷ In the latter, a relation of reason is present, since the things are the cause of the existence in the intellect of the real relation of correspondence in which the truth consists.³⁸ Hence, the things are said to be true denominatively in virtue of the truth present in the intellect, and not because of a truth present in them.³⁹ Moreover, a real relation of correspondence is present in the intellect only when it judges in the right way, that is, when it recognizes how things are (or are not) arranged in the world. In fact, the adequate significatio of an act of judging of the intellect (as expressed by a true declarative sentence) is distinct from the thing signified by the subject of that sentence.⁴⁰ Because of Giles's peculiar interpretation of the notion of *adaequatio*, to use such a term can somehow hide the lack of symmetry in the relation holding between the (true) intellect and the things—and this fact explains why in his later works (like the *Quodlibeta*) Giles utilizes the term “assimilation” (*assimilatio*) instead of “adequation” (*adaequatio*). Though the (true) intellect corresponds to the things understood because it conforms to them, the things correspond to the intellect not because they conform to it but because the intellect conforms to them.⁴¹ The logical results of this

³⁷ *Ibid.*, II, q. 2, fol. b4ra: “Ad istam quaestionem <scilicet utrum veritas in ipso intellectu habeat esse> dico quod veritas, sicut accipimus hic veritatem pro adaequatione, est in ipso intellectu.”

³⁸ *Ibid.*, II, q. 2, fol. b4rb: “Sic ista adaequatio non ponit aliquid reale nisi in ipso intellectu; unde ista adaequatio secundum rem est in ipso intellectu et non est in ipsis rebus nisi secundum rationem, scilicet propter hoc quod ipsa adaequatio dependet ex ipsis rebus.”

³⁹ *Ibid.*, II, q. 2, fol. b4rb: “Dicitur etiam res vera non propter veritatem quae sit in ipsa, sed propter veritatem quae sit in ipso intellectu, sive in anima.”

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, II, q. 3, fols. b4rb–va.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, II, q. 2, fol. b4ra–b; see also *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7 (Leuven, 1646), p. 215: “Memini enim assignasse nos causam quare veritas sit in intellectu et non in rebus eo quod veritas consistat in quadam adaequatione, et quia intellectus noster dependet a rebus (sicut scientia dependet a scibili), et quia adaequatio quandam relationem importat (sicut scibile refertur ad scientiam non per relationem quae sit in ipso, sed per relationem quae est in scientia), sic res adaequatur intellectui nostro non per adaequationem quae est in rebus, sed per adaequationem quae est in intellectu. Res enim praeexistunt, intellectus vero imitatur eas ad adaequatur ipsis; imitatio ergo et adaequatio est in ipso intellectu. Intellectus ergo noster adaequatur rebus per adaequationem quae est in intellectu. Si autem res ipsae dicantur adaequatae intellectui, hoc non est quia ipsae res adaequantur, sed quia intellectus adaequatur. Et quia adaequatio est in ipso intellectu, veritas etiam, quae adaequationem importat, dicitur esse in intellectu.”

choice are the following: (1) there is no truth but in relation to an intellect; (2) truth is an asymmetrical relation, since Giles's *adaequatio* is so; and (3) by truly judging about the metaphysical composition of a thing, the intellect becomes similar to that thing.

Although the first conclusion is already present in the writings of Aquinas, Giles attributes to it a different value. According to the supporters of the ontological theory of truth, the relation of a thing to the (divine) intellect was a necessary requisite too: things are true insofar as they are ordered to the (divine) intellect. For Thomas, the truth of a thing includes the *entity* of that thing and a relation of adequation to the (divine) intellect. Giles reads this relation to the intellect (whether divine, angelic, or human intellect) in terms of being known by it. As a consequence, in his view, the truth of a thing does not include its absolute being (or entity) and a relation of adequation to the (divine) intellect but its being known by an intellect and a relation of likeness to the thing itself. Both these elements are present in the intellect (and not in the thing) as in their substrate of existence. For Aquinas, a thing is true if and only if it is actually existent and conformable to its exemplar in the mind of God; for Giles, a thing is true only derivatively, when and as far as it is known by an intellect. In other words: unlike Thomas, Giles connects the truth of a thing with its essence and therefore with its possible (and not actual) being—according to what he states in his *Quaestiones de esse et essentia* and in his *Quodlibet* II, where he equates the *esse essentiae* with the *esse in potentia* (*ad esse*).⁴² So, paradoxically, a thing can be rightly understood, and thus it can be said (in a derivative way) to be true, even though it is not actually existent outside the soul.⁴³

This close tie between essence and truth is confirmed by what he says in analyzing the notion of *adaequatio* in relation to the intellect. As we have already seen, in Giles's opinion, the quiddity (*quidditas*) of things as

⁴² Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quaestiones de esse et essentia*, q. 12, fols. 27rb and 29ra; *Quodlibet* II, q. 2, p. 51. On this subject, see Nash's papers mentioned above, note 1.

⁴³ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, p. 214: "Sciendum quod res dicitur vera prout est ab intellectu co-gnita, sicut dicitur bona prout est ab appetitu volita. Est enim verum obiectum intellectus, sicut bonum est obiectum appetitus. Res autem non cognoscitur per cognitionem quae est in ipsa, nec per aliud quod est in ipsa, sed per illud quod est in intellectu. Sunt enim res cognitae non prout sunt in seipsis, sed prout sunt in cognoscente; ideo sunt verae non per veritatem quae sit in ipsis formaliter, sed per id quod est in cognoscente. Sed non sic est ex parte bonitatis. [...] Existente enim forma balnei in intellectu, etiam non existente balneo in re extra, possumus intelligere balneum et proprietates balnei, et quaecumque pertinent ad naturam balnei. Ad intellectum ergo balnei sufficit balneum ut est in intellectu, etiam si nihil esset de balneo in re extra."

expressed by their definitions is the object of our understanding.⁴⁴ That being said, he affirms many times that the true (*verum*) is the object of the intellect. Then, in his view, the true is somehow identical to the essence. The true is the essence itself *qua* known by the intellect. And the truth (*veritas*) is the relation of becoming similar to that inheres in an intellect and joins it to an essence by means of the intentional nature of the *species intelligibilis*. In turn, the *adaequatio* is threefold, since three are the kinds of intellect at issue. In fact, when it is known by the divine intellect, the essence is understood as the nature of a thing which is apt to be caused by the intellect (*apta nata causari ab intellectu*). When it is known by the angelic intellect, the essence is understood as the nature of a thing which is apt to be caused by a superior intellect, just as its intelligible species present in the angelic intellect—since both the essence and its intelligible species are caused by the divine intellect. Finally, when it is known by a human intellect, the essence is understood as the nature of a thing which is apt to cause a mental picture in the intellect (*apta natua causare similitudinem in intellectu*).⁴⁵ Those essences which are unable to cause any such effects in an intellect are empty and fictitious, like the concept of the chimera.⁴⁶

These remarks help us to appreciate the peculiar nature of Giles's *adaequatio*. It is a relation, and the principle (*ratio*) itself of the truth. It assumes different values according to the different kinds of intellect to which it is referred. In the case of the angelic and human intellects, the *adaequatio* is a real relation, while it is a relation of reason in the case of the divine intellect, since the knowledge of the human (and angelic) intellect depends on the thing understood, whereas any possible thing depends on God's cognition. Although the *adaequatio* always entails a certain form of *similitudo*, nevertheless the *adaequatio* proper to the human intellect is not a standard relation of similarity, as it is asymmetrical and has no *fundamentum*.⁴⁷ It is a relation of *reproduction* (or copying, so to

⁴⁴ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 5, fol. e1ra. See also *Quaestiones de cognitione angelorum*, qq. 6 and 9 (Venice, 1503), fols. 89va–b and 101va–b; *Quodlibet* V, q. 9, pp. 289–91.

⁴⁵ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, pp. 214–15.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 215: "Si vero esset talis adaequatio, quae nec esset apta nata causari a rebus, nec causare res, nec causari a tertio, sicut est conceptus chimerae, vel alicuius figmenti, in tali intellectu non acciperetur veritas, sed diceretur huiusmodi intellectus esse vanus et cassus."

⁴⁷ The *fundamentum* of a relation is that absolute entity in virtue of which the relation inheres in its substrate and entails a reference to another substance; for instance, the generative power is the foundation of the relation of paternity.

say) rather than a relation of similarity. The intellect must be said to be (or become) similar to the essence understood, when it rightly judges about it. Yet, no essence is said to be similar to its knowledge present in the human intellect, no matter whether adequate or not. This asymmetry originates from the intentional nature of the mental acts of understanding (both simple and complex). Through these acts the intellect tries to bring about a mental replica of the thing understood, which it assumes as the pattern of its act of reproduction.

Since for Giles the truth is the *adaequatio intellectus ad rem*, one may ask why the simple apprehension of an essence and the act of judging are linked to each other; and why we can properly speak of truth (and falsity) only in the case of an act of judging of our intellect and not in the case of a simple apprehension of the essence of a thing.

As Giles points out,⁴⁸ it is the apprehension itself of an essence that necessarily gives rise to an act of judging whereby our intellect expresses, in a definition, the metaphysical structure of the essence understood. Because of its organization, our intellect can get the nature of things, which is simple and unitary in reality, only through its internal composition. The cause of this is to be found in the modalities of functioning of our intellect, which can grasp only separately the different aspects of a thing that in empirical reality is one and the same.⁴⁹ The things understood are the standards that guide our intellect in its actions of composition (when it produces an affirmative statement) and division (when it produces a negative statement) about themselves. So, the sense-cognition testifies to the actual existence of a thing; the intellectual abstraction enables us to recognize the type the thing belongs to; but it is by the act of judging that we can think of the inner metaphysical principles of a thing as principles of that thing; their mutual relationships; and the extramental things themselves as bearers of accidental properties.

The process of knowledge, which is aimed at reproducing the internal structure of and the various states connected with the essence of things, can fail to achieve its goal, since in the act of judging our will plays an

⁴⁸ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, VII, q. 5, fol. e1ra. See also *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, pp. 215–16; and *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, pp. 280–82; *Super Analytica Posteriora*, I, fol. A8ra–vb.

⁴⁹ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fol. b4ra. *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, pp. 215–16; *Super Analytica Posteriora*, I, fol. A8ra: "Intellectus de rebus potest sibi formare conceptum completum, ut non solum sciat nomen referre in suum significatum, quod dicitur esse quid nominis, sed etiam ipsum significatum sciat resolvere in sua propria principia; et inde sciat formare definitionem, quae dicitur esse quid rei."

eminent role.⁵⁰ The final stage of the process of knowing is therefore different from the sense-cognition and the abstraction (or simple apprehension of an essence), since the latter are totally passive and unintentional, while the former is a voluntary action. As such, the judgment is open to fault. It is in this possibility of an erroneous judgment that the truth is rooted. The idea of Giles, inspired by Aristotle (*De anima*, Γ 6, 430a28–b6) and Aquinas,⁵¹ is that “truth” and “falsehood,” properly speaking, are (like the notions of truth and falsehood we have today) antonymous, and where their (paradigmatic) opposition fails, we can speak of truth only in a secondary and derivative sense.⁵² Sense-cognition and abstraction in a certain way are always true, since no mistake is possible in the simple apprehension of the existence of a thing or in the intellection of its essence. Only if the intellect, through an act of judging, forms a statement about a thing, is it possible to compare our knowledge, as expressed by a declarative sentence, with the thing itself, and so to give rise to the opposite relations of truth and falsehood.⁵³

Giles’s position is, therefore, far from Thomas’s view as stated in the *De veritate* and in the *Summa theologiae*, given that he is more faithful to Aristotle than the Dominican Master. If we compare Giles’s remarks on truth in the Commentary on the *Sentences* (which was written in the same years as the *Quaestiones metaphysicales*) with Thomas’s conception as developed in his commentary on the same work, the difference between them is still greater. Giles openly criticizes some chief theses of Thomas’s (earlier) doctrine. In his commentary on the *Sentences*, Aquinas had maintained that the being of the truth is similar to the being of the universal. Giles argues that this thesis is not consistent with Aristotle’s claim that truth is present in the judging intellect as in its own substrate of inherence.⁵⁴ As he remarks, the term “*fundamentum*” has a twofold meaning: it designates either the substrate of existence (*subiectum*) of a thing; or something existing outside the soul which corresponds to and/or is the cause of a certain operation of the intellect. In his opinion, when Thomas says that the universal has its *fundamentum* in the things existing outside the soul, he speaks of *fundamentum* in the first of the two senses just

⁵⁰ Cf. *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 8, fol. b6rb–va; *Quodlibet* V, q. 6, p. 281.

⁵¹ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 17, a. 1 and a. 4.

⁵² Cf. Giles of Rome, *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fols. b4vb–5ra; q. 8, fol. b6va; *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, p. 216.

⁵³ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 7, p. 216.

⁵⁴ Cf. Giles of Rome, *Super librum I Sententiarum*, d. 19, p. 2, q. 1 (Venice, 1521), fol. 111rb.

mentioned. Because of the parallelism between universality and truth, the same holds for truth. As a consequence, truth is in the things (and not in the intellect) as in its own substrate of existence—a conclusion which is just the opposite of what Aristotle had thought.⁵⁵ So, at the end of a long passage, Giles restates that things can be said to be true only derivatively, in virtue of the truth present in the intellect, since truth is a quality that has in the intellect its own substrate of inherence. Things can be said to be true only in the sense that in them there is a (partial) conformity to their own metaphysical principles, so that they are truthful, so to say, about themselves. Real truth is nothing but the entity itself of the things.⁵⁶

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Giles's *Quaestiones metaphysicales* is a “paradoxical” work, since it cannot be considered as a real contribution to metaphysics, according to Giles's own view. The Italian master claims that metaphysics deals with being *qua* being; but only very few of his *Quaestiones* discuss the structure of the main kinds of beings and the relationships among the basic constituents of reality. However, if the foregoing analysis is correct, something can be said about Giles's (“early”) world. First of all, his is already a (medieval) Aristotelian world, no less than Aquinas's. Like any other (medieval) Aristotelian world, it seems to consist of things (both singular and universal, such as individual substances, accidental forms, and common natures or essences) and a sort of state of affairs connected with them (namely, *complex things* such as that something of a certain nature exists, or that something, which exists, is such and such). To be a particular substance is the main and basic property within Giles's system, the cornerstone of his ontology, since, from the point of view of full existence, accidents and substantial essences always presuppose particular substances. Substantial essences and accidents are not self-subsistent entities; they can exist only in individual substances. In Giles's view, the beings of substantial essences as well as those of the concrete accidental forms inhering in a singular substance somehow coincide with the actual being of the singular substance. For instance, if considered from the point of view of his being, Socrates is a simple object, namely, a singular substance, while if considered from the point of view of his internal structure, he is a compound of

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 111rb–va.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 111vb. See also the *Qu. Met.*, II, q. 3, fol. b5ra.

really different forms which can be something actually real only in him, as his components, and through his actual being. It is impossible to find a particular substance which does not belong to a certain species and without any accident inhering in it, however. Given that (1) to be a particular substance is to be an independent singular existing item, whereas (2) to be an essence (or common nature) is to be the type of a singular substance, and (3) to be an accident is to be a formal aspect of a singular substance, then the distinction between accidents and substantial essences derives from their different relations to particular substances. Common natures are parts of the essential being of substances, by means of which they can be classified and defined. By contrast, those items which simply affect particular substances without being actually parts of their *esse essenziale* are accidents. This implies that the relationship between substantial essences and singular substances is ultimately grounded on individuation, since no instantiation is possible without individuation. Individuation is fundamental to both universals and singulars, essence and existence, and substances and accidents. Individual substances can exist as metaphysical entities, located at a particular place in space and time, and can be identified as tokens of a given type only by means of the process of individuation through which common natures produce them. This means that, within Giles's world, the *materia signata*, which is the cause of individuation, is the principle for the existence of anything in the sublunary world, in that no being could pass from a state of pure potentiality (proper to what is common) to a state of actual being (proper to what is singular) without matter.

APPENDIX
LIST (TABULA) OF GILES'S QUAESTIONES METAPHISICALES

LIBER I

- q. 01 Utrum metaphysica sit finis sive beatitudo ipsius hominis
- q. 02 Utrum unumquodque naturaliter feratur in suum finem
- q. 03 Utrum homines naturaliter appetitu scientiam desiderent
- q. 04 Utrum omnes homines appetant metaphysicam
- q. 05 Utrum Deus sit subiectum in metaphysica
- q. 06 Utrum idem sit esse de consideratione alicuius scientiae et esse subiectum illius scientiae
- q. 07 Utrum Deus sit subiectum alicuius
- q. 08 Utrum Deus sit de consideratione alicuius scientiae specialis
- q. 09 Utrum Deus possit esse de consideratione metaphysici
- q. 10 Utrum scientia sit nobilior ex eo quod non considerat Deum pro subiecto sed considerat ipsum in quantum ens
- q. 11 Utrum causa sit subiectum istius scientiae metaphysicae
- q. 12 Utrum sensus prater utilitatem vitae debeat diligere
- q. 13 Utrum probare dilectionem scientiae per dilectionem sensus sit probare dilectionem scientiae per signum
- q. 14 Utrum visus sit magis diligens inter omnes sensus
- q. 15 Utrum visus differentias plurium rerum nobis ostendat
- q. 16 Utrum bruta habeant prudentiam
- q. 17 Utrum solus auditus sit sensus disciplinabilis
- q. 18 Utrum experimentum sit ex pluribus memoriis
- q. 19 Utrum ars generetur experimentum
- q. 20 Utrum artifex sit melior experto
- q. 21 Utrum artes mechanicae sint meliores speculativis
- q. 22 Utrum sapientia sit omnia scire
- q. 23 Utrum sapientia sive metaphysica sit difficilis
- q. 24 Utrum scientia ista sit certissima
- q. 25 Utrum ista scientia sit libera vel serva
- q. 26 Utrum ista scientia habeat regulare alias
- q. 27 Utrum substantiis competat suscipere magis et minus

LIBER II

- q. 01 Utrum veritas sit possibilis
- q. 02 Utrum veritas habeat esse in ipso intellectu
- q. 03 Utrum aliqua veritas sit incomplexa
- q. 04 Utrum veritas et scientia different
- q. 05 Utrum veritas incomplexa sit difficilis ad cognoscendum
- q. 06 Utrum veritas sit difficilis
- q. 07 Utrum veritas sit impossibilis ad cognoscendum
- q. 08 Utrum difficultas in cognitione veritatis sit ex parte nostra an ex parte rerum
- q. 09 Utrum intellectus humanus corpori corruptibili coniunctus possit Deum et substantias separatas intelligere

- q. 10 Utrum dato quod intellectus esset praeparatio quaedam, sicut posuit Anaxagoras, possemus per talme praeparationem intelligere substantias separatas
- q. 11 Utrum intellectus noster per intellectionem illarum quidditatum inferiorum possit substantias separatas intelligere
- q. 12 Utrum intellectus noster per hoc quod seipsum intelligit possit huiusmodi substantias intelligere et etiam materiales
- q. 13 Utrum dignius sit ipsum intellectum intelligere substantias immateriales (materiales *ed.*) quam materiales (immateriales *ed.*)
- q. 14 Utrum ex unione nostri intellectus and intellectum agentem possumus substantias separatas intelligere
- q. 15 Utrum homo in hac via possit huiusmodi substantias intelligere
- q. 16 Utrum sit una aliqua veritas simplex
- q. 17 Utrum ab una veritate omnia vera possent dici vera
- q. 18 Utrum sit status in causis efficientibus
- q. 19 Utrum sit status in causis materialibus
- q. 20 Utrum sit status in causis finalibus
- q. 21 Utrum sit status in causis formalibus
- q. 22 Utrum sit eadem dispositio rei in sua veritate et in sua entitate

LIBER IV

- q. 01 Utrum aliqua scientia possit considerare ens secundum quod ens
- q. 02 Utrum ista scientia sit una
- q. 03 Utrum ens sit aequivocum an analogum
- q. 04 Utrum omnia quae dicuntur analogia dicantur <taliam> per analogiam ad unum numero
- q. 05 Utrum unum quod est principium numeri convertatur cum ente
- q. 06 Utrum possit esse aliquid unum quod convertatur cum ente
- q. 07 Utrum unum addat aliquid supra ens
- q. 08 Utrum unum quod est principium numeri differat ad unum quod convertitur cum ente
- q. 09 Utrum unum addat aliquid rationis supra ens
- q. 10 Utrum unum quod est principium numeri inveniatur in substantiis separatis
- q. 11 Utrum de unitate quae est principium numeri possit praedicari quantitas
- q. 12 Utrum circa illud principium, impossibile est aliquid simul esse et non esse, possibilis sit error
- q. 13 Utrum illud principium, impossibile est aliquid simul esse et non esse, possit demonstrari
- q. 14 Utrum substantia de aliquo demonstratur

LIBER VI

- q. 01 Utrum una cognitione declaretur quod quid (quicquid *ed.*) est <et si est> vel esse
- q. 02 Utrum accidentia habeant aliquam entitatem <et naturam>

LIBER VII

- q. 01 Utrum substantia sit prior accidente <cognitione, definitione et> tempore
- q. 02 Utrum accidentia habeant definitionem per additamentum
- q. 03 Utrum res sit idem cum sua quidditate

- q. 04 Utrum quidditatis (quidditas *ed.*) sit quidditas
- q. 05 Utrum definitio habeat partes
 - 5.1 quaeritur quales partes habeat definitio
- q. 06 Utrum particulare mathematicum sit incorruptibile
- q. 07 Utrum particularia possint definiri
- q. 08 Utrum partes quantitativae ingrediantur definitionem totius
- q. 09 Utrum genus in definitione ponatur ut materia
- q. 10 Utrum differentia habeat rationem actualitatis et dicat quid in actu
- q. 11 Utrum addendo differentiam generi in definitione fiat nugatio
- q. 12 Utrum substantiae separatae habeant definitionem

LIBER VIII

- q. 01 Utrum per nomen significetur forma aut aggregatum
- q. 02 Utrum in corporibus caelestibus sit materia
- q. 03 Utrum eadem sit materia in corporibus caelestibus et in illis inferioribus
- q. 04 Utrum dimensiones indeterminatae praecedant formam substantialem in materia
- q. 05 [Utrum] Quomodo dimensiones in<de>terminatae praecedant formam substantialem in materia

LIBER X

- q. 01 Utrum mensura sit in eodem genere cum mensurato
- q. 02 Utrum omnia quae mesurantur mesurentur una mensura
- q. 03 Utrum omnia mesurentur minimo sui generis
- q. 04 Utrum omnium substantiarum sit una mensura
- q. 05 [Utrum] Quomodo opponantur unum et multa
- q. 06 Utrum ratio mensurae competat Deo proprie aut transumptive

LIBER XI

- q. 01 Utrum, si materia est una et agens <est unum>, [quod] esset semper effectus unus
- q. 02 Utrum generatum a simili et generatum non a simili sint eiusdem speciei
- q. 03 Utrum illa propositio Aristotelis quod omne quod sit sit a simili in specie sit vera

